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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent/Appellant, 
v. 
ELROY TILLMAN, 
Petitioner/Appellee-
Case No. 20030148-SC 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
CLARIFICATIONS 
In his response brief, Tillman includes, discusses, and refers to items that are not part 
of the record, matters that are not at issue in this appeal, and inaccurate facts. For example: 
1. Tillman refers to and has attached as addenda A-D, statements that are not part of the 
record. The State has filed amotion to strike. The statements support the State's arguments, 
and Tillman conceded that they were provided to him prior to trial. However they were 
never made a part of the record in the criminal case or the post-conviction case. Therefore, 
they are not part of the record on appeal, and should be stricken and disregarded, along with 
portions of the brief that discuss them at pages 50-53 and 56, and footnotes 38, 40 and 41. 
2. Tillman asserts that his defense counsel never received prior notice of any of the three 
polygraph tests conducted on Carla Sagers, and that they only learned of the tests "quite by 
chance on the eve of trial" (brief at 13-14). The record establishes that they knew about 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
% 
polygraph exams at least a week before trial. Trial began on January 4, 1983. Seven days 
before trial, on December 28, 1982, Tillman's counsel filed a motion in limine to admit ' 
polygraph evidence (R. 89). They filed a supporting memorandum two days later (R. 92-97). 
The memorandum specifically refers to Carla Sagers and states that "[a] number of polygraph 
examinations have been conducted ... " (R. 92-93) (addendum A). 
3. Tillman sought post-conviction relief on a claim that the prosecutor improperly 
injected religion into his closing argument. The post-conviction court dismissed this claim 
as procedurally barred (R. 736). Tillman did not file any cross appeal challenging that ruling. 
Instead, Tillman intentionally and inappropriately attempts to sway this court's opinion by i 
including statements about the procedurally barred claim. Footnote 42 should therefore be 
stricken and disregarded. 
4. Tillman repeatedly refers to the partial transcripts as being "concealed." This mis-
represents the record and the post-conviction court's findings. To "conceal" means to hide 
or to prevent disclosure. "It often implies a certain design or artfulness." Webster's 3rdNew 
International Dictionary, p. 469 (1993). The post-conviction court made no finding that 
suppression was intentional. The court said: "it is unclear who was responsible for making 
the recordings and having them transcribed." (R. 755). The court found only that 
"prosecutors knew, or should have known, of the existence of the partial transcripts and, 
therefore, either knowingly or inadvertently failed to disclose this important information to 
defense counsel prior to trial." (R. 756) (emphasis added). In footnote 10, Tillman asserts 
that at the post-conviction hearing, the judge appeared to have concluded that the prosecutor 
2 
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had made the tapes. Whatever was said in open court, upon reflection, the court apparently 
determined that the evidence was not sufficient to establish who had made the tapes. The 
Court's final written ruling controls. See State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 887 (Utah 1978).1 
Who may have prepared or suppressed the partial transcripts and whether the 
suppression was intentional or inadvertent is not at issue in this appeal. Tillman has not 
directly challenged the court's ruling on this issue. Instead, Tillman improperly attempts to 
sway this court's opinion by including comments about matters that are not at issue on 
appeal. Footnotes 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 10, 15, 16, 17, 26 and all references to the transcripts being 
"concealed" should therefore be disregarded. 
5. In his Statement of the Case, Tillman asserts that Sgt. Thirsk testified that both partial 
transcripts were from the interviews he conducted with Carla Sagers. This misrepresents the 
record. Sgt. Thirsk stated in his affidavit: 
27. At this point in time (more than 18 years after the fact), I cannot be 
certain that these are both transcripts of my interactions with Sagers. 
(PR. 498). At the evidentiary hearing in the post-conviction case, Sgt. Thirsk testified: 
1
 The State has acknowledged that the suppression prong of the Brady require-
ments has been met (State's brief at 6, n. 1). The prosecutor is responsible for "any 
favorable evidence known to the others acting on the government's behalf in the case, 
including the police." Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 437, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 1567 (1995). 
In addition, the Brady suppression prong applies "irrespective of the good faith or bad 
faith of the prosecution." Brady v. State, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 1197 (1963). 
"The principle . . . is not punishment of society for misdeeds of a prosecutor but 
avoidance of an unfair trial to the accused." Id. "If the suppression of evidence results in 
constitutional error, it is because of the character of the evidence, not the character of the 
prosecutor." United States v. Agurs, All U.S. 97, 110, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 2400 (1976). 
3 
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"Exhibit No. 1 may or may not have been the same test, or it may have been the first one. 
I don't know. But it is definitely a pre-test interview format. It is simply a discussion of 
issues. They are both incomplete, so I can't say." (PR. 801:162). 
6. Tillman states that Sagers admitted that the idea of setting a fire was hers (brief at 55). 
This mischaracterizes the record. Sagers testified that Tillman said he could burn the house 
down (R. 1154). The idea of starting the fire was Tillman's. Sagers admitted that she 
brought up the idea of "putting cigarettes on it and making it look like he was smoking in 
bed." (R. 1150-51). 
7. Tillman includes numerous quotes from dissenting opinions in his appellate cases. 
Quotes from the dissents are not the law of the case and do not express the majority opinion 
about the facts of this case. Moreover, Tillman's use of factual inferences from the dissents 
conveys an inaccurate impression of the facts presented at trial.2 Discussion of the dissenting 
2
 In footnote 1, Tillman refers to Justice Stewart's dissenting comment that 
"[according to her testimony, [Sagers] was an equally culpable partner in the crime." 
Tillman II, 855 P.2d at 228. This is incorrect. At trial, Sagers testified that it was Tillman 
who struck Mark Schoenfeld in the head with an ax and set the bed on fire (R. 967, 970-
72). Although Sagers was culpable as an accomplice, and could have been prosecuted if 
not given immunity, Tillman's and Sagers's actions were clearly not equally culpable. 
Justice Stewart's dissent also incorrectly states that "Carla Sagers herself on a prior 
occasion had set out alone to kill Mark Schoenfeld, but withdrew before the final act." 
Tillman II, 855 P.2d at 228. Testimony at trial was that Tillman and Sagers drove past 
Schoenfeld's house and parked (R. 919-920). Tillman had a gun, and he told Sagers that 
he was going to kill Schoenfeld (R. 919,921). Sagers tried to talk him out of it and 
Tillman "said, 'Well, you go do it then' and I told him I couldn't do it. So he said, 'Well, 
I will go do it myself.' And that is when I took the gun from him and I got out of the car 
and I told him to go home." (R. 921). Sagers testified that she never brandished the gun 
or took shots at anybody, and that she never intended to kill Schoenfeld (R. 922). 
In footnote 37, Tillman again refers to Justice Stewart's dissent, which stated that 
4 
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opinions in Tillman's brief, p. 5, and footnotes 1, 37 and 42 should be disregarded. 
8. Tillman says that prosecutor Christensen testified that "[h]e did not know how it 
would have been possible for someone else to record the interviews without his knowledge.'' 
(brief at 11). This mis-states the record. Christensen was not present during the entire 
polygraph interviews. Christensen testified that he was present for portions of the interviews 
(PR. 801:55,81-82,105). When defense counsel asked "was there anybody else in that room 
that may have been able to record without your knowledge or his?" Christensen answered: 
"Not that I am aware of." (PR. 801:88). This obviously referred to when Christensen was 
present. Christensen also testified that "[i]t is possible interviews and interrogations were 
recorded, and then transcribed without my knowledge." (PR. 801: 88-89). 
9. Tillman states: "Defense counsel could have resolved the conflict between the testi-
mony of Carla Sagers and that of Ken Thirsk in favor of Ken Thirsk had he had the withheld 
transcripts." (brief, at 48). Tillman specifies no actual conflict in testimony. Tillman also 
Tillman's most serious crimes were committed more than twenty years ago. It is unclear 
which crimes Justice Stewart believed were "most serious." However, Tillman was 
convicted of a federal drug offense in 1978. He then committed the probation violation of 
felon in possession of a gun, and was sent to prison in March of 1979 (prelim, p. 56). 
Tillman came to Utah in 1980, shortly after being released from prison (prelim, p. 60). 
Tillman met Carla Sagers when he reported to the Utah office of the Federal Bureau of 
Prisons (prelim, p. 100 and R. 853-54). 
In footnote 42, Tilhnan refers to Justice Durham's comment in dissent, that the 
prosecutor told the jury that Tillman would be free again in fifteen years if they did not 
impose the death penalty. Tillman /, 750 P.2d at 584. This is accurate. However, 
Tillman's defense counsel first told the jury that "a life sentence, even in Utah which is 
relatively easy in the light sentence area, as I am informed to believe, is probably 15 or 20 
years." (R. 1953). In rebuttal, the prosecutor merely echoed the term of 15 years already 
used by defense counsel (R. 1977). See Tillman I, 750 P.2d at 560. 
5 
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cites to "R. 140, 160, 166." (brief at 48). These record cites do not support the allegation.3 
10. Tillman asserts that the state's failure to disclose "complete transcripts or audio 
recordings of the polygraph interviews" violated his due process rights (brief at 29). This 
mis-states the court's ruling and the record. There was no requirement that the interviews 
be recorded, and there is no testimony or evidence that there ever were "complete" audio 
recordings or transcripts of the interviews. It is possible that only a portion of the interviews 
were ever recorded and transcribed. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE POST-CONVICTION COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT 
TILLMAN HAD ESTABLISHED THAT HIS BRADY CLAIM 
COULD NOT HAVE BEEN PREVIOUSLY RAISED. 
(Reply to Tillman's Point I) 
Utah's Post-Conviction Remedies Act prohibits relief upon any ground that "could 
have been, but was not, raised in a previous request for post-conviction relief." Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-35a-106(l)(d). Tillman previously filed two state petitions for relief which were 
denied. The State raised a procedural bar defense to the Brady claims raised in Tillman's 
third petition. Tillman has the burden to disprove the procedural bar by a preponderance of 
the evidence. Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-105. Tillman failed to meet his burden of proof 
because he failed to establish that he could not have raised the Brady claim in one of his 
prior petitions. The post-conviction court erroneously concluded otherwise. 
3
 R. 140 is the first page of requested jury instructions, R. 160 is a page from 
requested jury instructions, and R. 166 is a proposed jury instruction (addendum B). 
6 
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The State's procedural bar argument is based upon Utah's Post-Conviction Remedies 
Act and the general principle that a "petitioner must conduct a reasonable and diligent 
investigation aimed at including all relevant claims and grounds for relief in the first [ ] 
petition." High v. Head, 209 F.3d 1257, 1263 (11th Cir. 2000) (citingMcClesky v. Zant, 499 
U.S. 467,497,111 S.Ct 1454,1472 (1991); andcf. ABA Guidelines in postconviction death 
penalty cases, #4 ("Counsel should make efforts to secure information in the possession of 
the prosecution... ").4 
Tillman claims that the State's argument would allow the State to hide evidence, and 
then place on petitioner the burden of attempting to discover any evidence the State has 
intentionally hidden. This mischaracterizes the State's argument. The State is not arguing 
that it was Tillman's burden to search for any Brady items the prosecution attempted to hide. 
The State's position is simply that any reasonably prudent post-conviction counsel would 
have reviewed the prosecution file to determine if there were any issues trial or appellate 
counsel overlooked.5 Tillman's post-conviction counsel concede that this is something they 
did not do (PR. 802:247). 
Tillman argues that the State' s position would require defense counsel to "continually 
re-examine the state's files on the lookout for previously hidden exculpatory evidence." 
4
 The c/cite is used because the ABA Guidelines have not been adopted in Utah 
for post-conviction purposes, and are therefore not controlling. 
5
 One of the most frequently raised issues in post-conviction is ineffective 
assistance of counsel. It seems reasonable for post-conviction counsel to review the 
prosecution file to determine if there were any issues missed by trial or appellate counsel. 
7 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
{ 
(brief at 23). Tillman's argument presumes that the transcripts were intentionally hidden. 
However, the post-conviction court specifically declined to reach that conclusion.6 
During trial, the prosecution had an open file policy. Trial counsel relied on this 
policy. Tillman argues that his post-conviction counsel were also entitled to rely on the open 
file policy. The State agrees that post-conviction counsel were entitled to rely on the open 
file policy - they could have reviewed the prosecutor's file because the prosecutor had an 
open file policy. Unfortunately, Tillman's post-conviction counsel did not rely on the open 
file policy, because they never looked at the prosecution file. Post-conviction counsel relied 
on trial counsels' statements that they had relied on the open file policy. Tillman cites no 
authority for the proposition that this is sufficient to meet his burden of proof. 
In addition, if (as Tillman argues) both partial transcripts are from the interviews 
performed by Sgt. Thirsk, they occurred shortly before trial, on December 8, 1982 and 
January 3, 1983 (PR. 801:138). The January 3rd interview was just one day before the start 
of trial on January 4*. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that transcripts of the January 
3rd interview and perhaps also the December 8th interview had not yet been prepared and had 
not yet made their way into the prosecution files prior to the start of trial. In fact, they may 
even have been transcribed during or after the trial. If trial counsel relied on the 
6
 As addressed above, the post-conviction court made no finding that the 
transcripts were intentionally withheld, and this is not at issue on appeal. The court 
concluded only that "prosecutors knew, or should have known, of the existence of the 
partial transcripts and, therefore, either knowingly or inadvertently failed to disclose this 
important information to defense counsel prior to trial." (R. 756). 
8 
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prosecution's open file policy and reviewed the prosecutor's file prior to trial, the transcripts 
likely would not yet have been in the prosecutor's file. 
Tillman acknowledges that "[t]he transcripts may have been in the files at the time of 
the first habeas proceedings, or they may not." (brief at 23). If Tillman's post-conviction 
counsel had examined the prosecution files, they could clearly state whether the transcripts 
were there or not. If the transcripts were not in the prosecution files when post-conviction 
counsel looked, there would be no procedural bar argument. Post-conviction counsel could 
state that they looked at the prosecution files and the transcripts were not there. However, 
since they never looked, Tillman cannot meet his burden to establish that he could not have 
raised his Brady claim in an earlier petition.7 
Tillman argues that his failure to raise the Brady claim earlier is comparable to the 
circumstances in Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 119 S.Ct. 1936 (1999) and Banks v. 
Dretke, U.S. , 124 S.Ct. 1256 (2004). However, the facts and circumstances of the 
Strickler and Banks cases are distinguishable from Tillman's case.8 In Strickler, some of the 
7
 In footnote 18, Tillman argues that even if he could and should have learned of 
the existence of the transcripts sooner, it would be appropriate for the Court to excuse his 
untimeliness. Tillman's argument relies on an exception that only applies to a time-bar 
defense. Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-107. The procedural bar argument is not based on 
untimeliness, but on the fact that this was a successive petition, and the Post-Conviction 
Remedies Act precludes issues that could have been raised in a previous petition. 
8
 Strickler and Banks are federal cases dealing with cause and prejudice issues. 
They do not discuss Utah's Post-Conviction Remedies Act, which precludes relief upon 
any ground that "could have been, but was not, raised in a previous request for post-
conviction relief." Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-106(l)(d). 
9 
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undisclosed evidence was not in the prosecutor's file, but was in police files which had 
apparently never been given to the prosecution.9 Strickler, 527 U.S. at 278, 119 S.Ct. at ^ 
1945-46. Thus, even if post-conviction counsel in Strickler had examined the prosecution 
file, they would not have found these disputed documents. Strickler, 527 U.S. at 279, 199 
S.Ct. at 1947. The same is not true in this case. The transcripts were located in files obtained 
from the district attorney's office, which had an open file policy. 
Strickler specifically states that it does not reach "the impact of a showing by the State 
that the defendant was aware of the existence of the documents in question and knew, or 
could reasonably discover how to obtain them." Strickler, 527U.S. at288,119 S.Ct. at 1951 i 
n. 33 (emphasis added); and see High v. Head, 209 F.3d 1257, 1265 (11th Cir. 2000). 
Tillman's post-conviction counsel could reasonably have discovered whether the transcripts 
i 
were in the prosecution files following trial simply by looking. This they failed to do. 
The facts and circumstances of the Banks case are also distinguishable. In Banks, the 
state did not disclose that one of the state's witnesses was a paid police informant, or that 
another witness's trial testimony had been intensively coached by prosecutors and law 
enforcement officers. In addition, the prosecution raised no red flag when the informant 
testified untruthfully that he never gave the police any statement. Banks, 124 S.Ct. at 1263. 
Finally, the state persisted in hiding the informant's status. Banks asserted in his state habeas 
petition that one of the witnesses was a police informant. In its answer to the petition, the 
9
 This is irrelevant as to the Brady suppression prong, but is relevant as to a 
procedural bar argument. 
10 
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State denied Banks's assertion. Banks, 124 S.Ct. at 1273. 
Sagers was not a paid police informant. Sagers was involved in the crime but had 
been given immunity, and the jury knew it (R. 996-97). In addition, the jury and counsel for 
Tillman knew that Sagers had given numerous statements, and Tillman's counsel knew that 
Sagers had been interviewed and interrogated by polygraph examiners. None of these facts 
were hidden from Tillman or from the jury. Tillman's counsel used Sagers's prior statements 
in their cross-examination (R. 1100-01. 1119, 1144-45,1171) and called Sgt. Thirsk, one of 
the polygraph examiners, as a defense witness to testify about what Sagers told him (R. 1582). 
Because Tillman's post-conviction counsel never reviewed the prosecution files, 
Tillman cannot establish that his counsel could not have discovered the transcripts in time 
to raise his Brady claim in an earlier petition. Tillman failed to meet his burden of proof to 
refute the State's procedural bar argument. The post-conviction court erroneously rejected 
the procedural bar defense. 
II. THE POST-CONVICTION COURT ERRED IN GRANTING 
THE PETITION BECAUSE TILLMAN FAILED TO 
ESTABLISH THAT THE TRANSCRIPTS ARE MATERIAL. 
(Reply to Tillman's Point II) 
As argued in the State's brief, even if Tillman's Brady claim is not procedurally 
barred, he is not entitled to relief because the partial transcripts of the polygraph interviews 
are not material. Materiality is the only Brady prong at issue in this appeal. 
"[E]vidence is material 'if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been 
disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.'" Strickler, 
11 
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527 U.S. at 280, 119 S.Ct. at 1948 (citing United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682, 105 
S.Ct 3375 (1985)); see also Engberg v. Wyoming, 265 F.3d 1100 (10th Cir. 2001); and 1 
United States v. Cbmfa, 267 F.3d 1167 (10* Cir. 2001). 
It is the "petitioner's burden [] to establish a reasonable probability of a different 
result." Strickler, 527 U.S. at 291 {citing Kyles 514 U.S. at 434). The State is not required 
to prove that disclosure of the partial transcripts would not have produced a different result. 
In order to be entitled to post-conviction relief, Tillman must establish that had the partial 
transcripts been available to his defense counsel, there is a reasonable probability of a 
different result at his sentencing. ) 
In Strickler, the United States Supreme Court detemiined that discrediting the 
witness's testimony might have changed the outcome of the trial.10 "That, however, is not 
I 
the standard that petitioner must satisfy in order to obtain relief. He must convince us that 
'there is a reasonable probability' that the result of the trial would have been different if the 
suppressed documents had been disclosed to the defense." Strickler, 527 U.S. at 289, 119 ' 
S.Ct. at 1952, (citing Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434, 115 S.Ct. 1555). 
"The question is not whether the defendant would more likely than not have received 
i 
10
 Tillman bases much of his argument on the Strickler case. However, it is 
important to note that in Strickler the United States Supreme Court found that the 
withheld evidence was nx)t material. Strickler, 527 U.S. at 296, 119 S.Ct. at 1955. 
Although it may just be a scrivener's error, Tillman mis-states the Strickler holding. 
Tillman states: "In finding that the evidence withheld by the state in Strickler was 
material,. . . "(brief at 43). In fact, the Supreme Court held that Strickler could not show 
either materiality under Brady or prejudice that would excuse his procedural default. 
Strickler, 527 U.S. at 296, 119 S.Ct. at 1955. 
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a different verdict with the evidence, but whether in its absence he received a fair trial, 
understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence." Strickler, 527 U.S. at 289-
90 (citing Kyles, 514 U.S. at 435, 115 S.Ct. at 1555). "[T]he question is whether 'the 
favorable evidence could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light 
as to undermine confidence in the verdict.'" Id, at 290. Tillman failed to establish that the 
transcripts put his case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in his sentence. 
Tillman argues that "Sagers was essential to the argument of Tillman's future 
dangerousness." (brief at 34). In considering future dangerousness, testimony from Lori 
Groneman was more powerful than from Sagers. However, even if true, Tillman fails to 
argue how or why this would make the partial transcripts material. Tillman merely argues 
that the transcripts would have allowed him to further discredit Sagers's testimony. This is 
not sufficient. To be entitled to relief, Tillman must establish that if the transcripts had been 
disclosed, there is a reasonable probability that the result of his sentencing would have been 
different. Strickler, 527 U.S. at 289, 119 S.Ct. at 1952. 
III. THE TRANSCRIPTS DO NOT ESTABLISH SAGERS'S 
DEMEANOR, OR THAT SHE WAS UNTRUTHFUL-
(Reply to Tillman's Point 11(1)) 
Tillman argues that Sagers's "demeanor" during the polygraph interviews diminished 
her credibility, and her laughter undermined confidence in her truthfulness. The term 
"demeanor" is not applicable. Demeanor refers to behavior, outward manner, conduct, 
bearing, mien, or facial appearance. Webster's 3rd New International Dictionary, p. 599 
(1993); cf. State v. Arguelles, 2003 UT 1, f 53, 63 P.3d 731, 746. A persons "demeanor" 
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cannot be established solely from type-written transcripts. 
In using the term "demeanor/' Tillman appears to be referring to the instances noted 
as "laugh" in the written transcripts. However, the written word "laugh" does not establish 
Sagers's demeanor and does not establish whether it was simply nervous laughter, inappro-
priate laughter, flippant laughter, or even calloused laughter. It merely states "laugh" without 
any further description or explanation. 
Tillman argues that the evidence that Sagers laughed during the interviews is relevant 
to her truthfulness. This is a leap of speculation not supported by any authority or evidence. 
Tillman has failed to establish any connection between notations that Sagers laughed during 
the interviews and whether she was telling the truth. The fact that Sagers engaged in nervous 
or even inappropriate laughter during the interviews has no connection to whether she was 
telling the truth. 
Tillman argues that Sagers's testimony "was a centerpiece of the state's closing 
arguments in the penalty phase." (brief at 43). This misrepresents the record (see transcript 
of penalty phase hearing, attached as addendum C). Carla Sagers did not even testify in the 
penalty phase hearing (addendum C,R. 1862-1983). Ofcoursethejurywasfreeto consider 
the testimony they heard from Sagers in the guilt phase along with all other testimony and 
evidence presented in the guilt phase. 
In his penalty phase closing argument, the prosecutor referred to Sagers. He 
addressed a possible concern the jury might have that Sagers had been granted immunity (R. 
1936-37). However, the prosecutor also emphasized Tillman's threatening statements to Lori 
14 
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Groneman, the way the murder was initiated against Mr. Schoenfeld (R. 1935-36), and 
Tillman's actions prior to the murder (R. 1939). The prosecutor also presented Tillman's 
criminal history.11 The prosecutor asked the jury to consider "the facts, the background and 
the completely senseless intentional and knowing killing that was conducted." (R. 1945). 
The centerpiece of the prosecutor's argument at the penalty hearing was not Carla Sagers, 
but the nature of the murder and Tillman's own actions and history. In addition, even if 
Sagers had been the "centerpiece" of the state's closing argument, Tillman has failed to 
establish why or how this would make the transcripts material. 
IV. ALLEGED "COACHING" DURING THE INTERVIEWS DOES 
NOT UNDERMINE CONFIDENCE IN TILLMAN'S SENTENCE. 
(Reply to Tillman's Point 11(2)) 
Tillman argues that evidence of "coaching" in the partial transcripts undermines 
confidence in his death sentence. However Tillman has failed to point to any evidence of 
coaching in the transcripts that undermines confidence in his death sentence. Sagers testified 
and was thoroughly cross-examined at trial. As this Court held in the direct appeal: "the 
question of [Sagers's] own degree of culpability, the possibility that she was lying about her 
own participation, and the resulting implications as to her credibility generally were well 
developed for the jury's consideration." Tillman /, 750 P.2d 546, 559 (Utah 1987). 
11
 Tillman had previously been convicted of seven felonies: attempted burglary, 
grand larceny, another grand larceny one year later, attempted robbery, an escape, 
possession of marijuana - a federal drug offense for "[sjmuggling 554 pounds of 
marijuana across the Mexican border" (prelim, p. 55), and probation violation - felon with 
a gun (R. 1935, 1939 & 1946). 
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In addition, Tillman totally ignores that Sgt. Thirsk's possible "coaching" led Sagers 
to admit more involvement in the murder, not less. Any "coaching" was actually beneficial 
to Tillman. Further emphasizing to the jury possible "coaching" could have been damaging 
to Tillman. It may have caused the jury to believe that Sagers was even less involved, and 
that she only confessed to more involvement because Thirsk bullied her into it. 
Finally, Thirsk's aggressive questioning was not "coaching." It was interrogation 
after what Thirsk believed were deceptive answers on the polygraph exam. At the post-
conviction evidentiary hearing, Thirsk explained that after he had concluded that some of 
Sagers's answers in the second polygraph were deceptive, he informed Sagers of the results, 
and then he proceeded with a more aggressive interrogation (PR. 801:161). Thirsk testified: 
A. . . . And then we would begin to discuss why there was a deceptive 
response to those questions, and see if we could come up with a logical 
explanation. We would begin at that point. Then it becomes an 
interrogation, rather than an interview. It is a more aggressive form of 
questioning, but in no case does it ever get abusive. It is just trying to sort 
out facts. 
Q. Is it fair to say you are trying to challenge her? 
A. Oh, definitely. 
(PR. 801:161). 
What Tillman calls "coaching" was actually aggressive interrogation. Thirsk believed 
that some of Sagers's answers on the polygraph exam had been deceptive as to her level of 
involvement in the murder. Thirsk was not "coaching" Sagers as to what to say. He was 
asking questions and challenging her to see if she would answer in ways that he believed 
would be more consistent with perceived deceptive answers on the polygraph exam. 
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V. IMPEACHMENT MATERIAL IN THE TRANSCRIPTS DOES 
NOT UNDERMINE CONFIDENCE IN TILLMAN'S SENTENCE. 
(Reply to Tillman's Point 11(3)) 
Tillman argues that the transcripts would have provided additional impeachment 
evidence that could have been used in cross-examination of Sagers. However, the transcripts 
do not contain any additional information that the defense did not already know at trial. As 
the post-conviction court noted: "much of the information contained in the partial transcripts 
is merely cumulative of evidence that was already known to trial counsel." (PR 759). 
"[Information relevant to the credibility of Ms. Sagers contained in the partial transcripts is, 
for the most part, the same information that was used during trial to attack Ms. Sagers' 
truthfulness." (PR. 751). There is no Brady violation where the defendant was already 
aware of the substance of the statements prior to trial. See State v. Bisner, 2001UT 99, ^  33, 
n. 1,37 P.3d 1073,1083. Information that is merely cumulative is not material and does not 
meet the third Brady requirement. 
Tillman has failed to cite any impeachment information from the transcripts that was 
not already known to the defense. In his brief, Tillman refers to two instances of possible 
impeachment evidence from the transcripts (brief, at 48-49). The first concerns where Sagers 
was when the blows were struck. That issue was raised and addressed in front of the jury at 
trial. At trial, the following exchange occurred between defense counsel and Sgt. Thirsk: 
Q. Was there any question and any answer from her in connection with 
whether or not she was in the room at the time of Mark Schoenfeld's 
death? 
A. Yes, her response to me was that she had been in the room, in the bedroom 
but as to where it was at the exact time of death, there was no conversation 
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regarding the time of death, but at the time blows were struck, that was the 
essence of the conversation. 
Q. Had she indicated to you previously that she had not been in the room at 
the time the blows were struck? 
A. Yes, she had told me previously she had not. 
(R. 1590-91). The information in the transcript was known to Tillman and was presented to 
the jury at trial. In addition, whether Sagers was standing in or out of the bedroom when 
Tillman struck Schoenfeld in the head with the ax is not material to Tillman's sentence. 
Tillman also claims that information in the transcripts would have made it possible 
for defense counsel to point out that Sagers's memory had improved in just a few days. He 
alleges that in the transcript Sagers said that Tillman asked her for "something" but at trial, 
she said that Tillman asked her to hand him an article of clothing. At the preliminary 
hearing, Sagers testified that Tillman "just had me hand him a shirt or something that was 
lying on the floor." (prelim, p. 124).12 Tillman's argument fails because he knew that Sagers 
had testified at the preliminary hearing that Tillman had her hand him a "shirt or something." 
In addition, whether Sagers said that Tillman had her hand him a shirt or something or an 
article of clothing is not material to Tillman's sentence. 
Tilhnan argues that the transcripts never mention Tillman's "revengefulness" and 
12
 Although the entire record was designated on appeal (R. 365), and a copy of the 
front page of the transcript of the preliminary hearing is included in the court file along 
with the front pages of other transcripts included on appeal, the front page of the 
preliminary hearing transcript does not contain a Bates stamp number. It is unclear 
whether it was actually part of the record included on direct appeal The State therefore 
refers to it by name and page number, and has also filed a motion to supplement the 
record to include the transcript of the preliminary hearing. 
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establish that Sagers "was not motivated by fear of Tillman/' (brief, at 58). However, the 
transcripts are only a portion of lengthy interviews. At trial, Sgt. Thirsk testified that he 
conducted "between eight and ten hours" of pre and posttest interrogation of Sagers (R. 
1717). The transcripts do not establish that Sagers was not motivated by fear of Tillman. 
They merely establish that in the partial transcripts, Sagers does not specifically state that she 
was motivated by fear of Tillman or his revengefulness. Sagers may have discussed her fear 
of Tillman or his revengefulness in other parts of the interviews. Tillman could have 
determined whether this was mentioned simply by asking Sgt. Thirsk.13 
Tillman also argues that Sagers made no mention of Tillman's "revengefulness" or 
being afraid of him in her prior statements. This is incorrect. The State has asked that the 
prior statements be stricken because they are not part of the record. However, if they are not 
stricken, the State points out that in her sworn statement taken on July 21,1982, when asked 
why she did not tell Tillman that she was going to leave or call the police, Sagers answered: 
"Maybe I was afraid of what he would do to me if I told." (Tillman's addendum C, p. 47). 
In addition, during her testimony at the preliminary hearing, when asked why she did not turn 
Tillman in to the police, Sagers responded: "One time he told me he was a repentftxl person 
and my feelings towards him." (prelim, p. 140). As Tillman acknowledges in his brief, "this 
may actually be Carla Sagers' first use on the record of the word 'revengeful,' rendered 
13
 This issue was never raised in the post-conviction petition or the evidentiary 
hearing. If Tillman's counsel had asked Thirsk this question, Thirsk may have told them 
that Sagers expressed fear of Tillman or his "revengefulness" in other parts of the 
interviews. 
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I 
'repentful' by a court reporter's error." (brief at 52). 
At trial, when asked why she allowed this to happen, Sagers said: "My feelings for ( 
Elroy, and at one time he told me he was a revengeful person." (R. 990). She also said: "I 
thought that if I did tell that he might do something to me." (R. 990). Upon cross-
examination, Sagers said: "He told me he was a revengeful person, he had a key to my 
apartment. I was afraid of losing my job, and that night that it happened, I was responsible 
for the government car." (R. 1061). Defense counsel asked Sagers why she did not call the 
police. Sagers said: 
A. Because of all those other reasons I told you before. ^ 
Q. You were afraid you were going to lose your job? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And that there was some underlying fear that Elroy might do something to 
you, is that right? 
A. Yes. i 
Q. That he never expressed? 
A. Just that he told me he was a revengeful person. 
(R. 1091). The record shows that at trial, Sagers testified as she had at the preliminary 
hearing, that she did not call the police because of her feelings for Tilhnan, and because he 
told her that he was a revengeful person. The partial polygraph interview transcripts add no 
new relevant information and are not material to this issue. 
Tilhnan also argues that it is relevant that the transcripts are of statements made 
shortly before trial. However, it is not clear that both of the partial transcripts are from the 
interviews shortly before trial. One of the partial transcripts may have been from Lt. 
Robinson's interview with Sagers which occurred early in the case, probably before the end 
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of May, 1982, long before trial (PR. 801:21). Sgt. Thirsk stated in his affidavit: 
27. At this point in time (more than 18 years after the fact), I cannot be 
certain that these are both transcripts of my interactions with Sagers. 
(PR. 498). At the evidentiary hearing in the post-conviction case, Sgt. Thirsk testified: 
"Exhibit No. 1 may or may not have been the same test, or it may have been the first one. 
I don't know. But it is definitely a pre-test interview format. It is simply a discussion of 
issues. They are both incomplete, so I can't say." (PR. 801:162). The two partial transcripts 
appear to be typed by different typewriters (addenda E & F of State's brief, and see PR. 
801:65). In addition, Thirsk testified that it was his impression that one of the transcripts 
probably came from a reel to reel recording, and the other transcript was probably made from 
a cassette player (PR. 801:171-72). Tillman's argument fails because it is not clear that the 
transcripts are both from the interviews that occurred shortly before trial. 
Tillman argues that evidence of Tillman's obsession with Lori Groneman and Mark 
Schoenfeld would not necessarily have been enough "to convince a jury that only death could 
stop Tillman from wreaking havoc in the lives of others." (brief at 53). Tillman argues that 
"[t]he state needed to generalize from the specific relationship between EIRoy and Lori to 
other relationships." (brief at 53). He claims that "[t]he state used Carla Sagers to generalize 
Tillman's specific pathological obsession with Lori Groneman." (brief at 54). 
Tillman's theory is not an accurate analysis of the prosecution's strategy. However, 
even if true, Tillman has failed to establish how or why this would make the partial 
transcripts material. Even if this were the prosecution strategy, the strategy could have been 
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used with or without disclosure of the partial transcripts. Tillman has failed to argue or 
establish that there is anything new in the partial transcripts that could have helped him i 
defend against this strategy. 
VI. THE TRANSCRIPTS DO NOT PAINT A DIFFERENT PICTURE 
OF THE MURDER. < 
(Reply to Tillman's Point 11(4)) 
Tillman argues that the statute under which he was sentenced to death "explicitly 
requires comparison of the actions, culpability and relative roles in the murder of co-
perpetrators." (brief at 59). Tillman claims that the State fails to see "that a co-perpetrator's 
role in a murder is part o/the circumstances of the crime." (brief at 59). Tillman mis- , 
characterizes the State's argument in order to make it easier to respond to. The State has 
never disputed that Sagers's actions and involvement during the course of the murder would 
be relevant. However, her "moral culpability" (the term used by the post-conviction court 
in its ruling), is not relevant and would not be admissible at Tillman's sentencing hearing. 
Certainly a co-participant's actual role in a murder is part of the circumstances of the 
crime. However, Sagers's "moral culpability" is not relevant to the appropriate sentence to 
be imposed on Tillman because it does not effect Tillman's level of "moral culpability." In 
the commission of a crime, who actually did what is finite and may be apportioned among 
the participants. However, "moral culpability" is not so limited. Each participant could be 
100 percent morally culpable, or anywhere from 0 to 100 percent. If one participant is 100 
percent morally culpable, that does not lower the moral culpability of other participants. 
At sentencing, Tillman's own degree of moral culpability would be relevant and 
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admissible as something the jury could consider as an aggravating or mitigating factor. 
However, Sagers's degree of "moral" culpability is not relevant to Tillman's moral 
culpability. Therefore, discussion of Sagers's degree of "moral" culpability would not be 
appropriate or admissible at Tillman's sentencing. 
The Capital felony sentencing statute which governed Tillman's sentencing states: 
2. In these sentencing proceedings, evidence may be presented as to any 
matter the court deems relevant to sentence, including but not limited to the 
nature and circumstances of the crime, the defendant's character, 
background, history, mental and physical condition, and any other facts in 
aggravation or mitigation of the penalty. Any evidence the court deems to 
have probative force may be received regardless of its admissibility under 
the exclusionary rules of evidence. The state's attorney and the defendant 
shall be permitted to present argument for or against sentence of death. 
Aggravating circumstances shall include those as outlined in 76-5-202. 
Mitigating circumstances shall include the following: 
(a) The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity; 
(b) The murder was committed while the defendant was under the 
influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance; 
(c) The defendant acted under extreme duress or under the substantial 
domination of another person; 
(d) At the time of the murder, the capacity of the defendant to 
appreciate the criminality (wrongfulness) of his conduct or to 
conform his conduct to the requirement of law was substantially 
impaired as a result of mental disease, intoxication, or influence of 
drugs; 
(e) The youth of the defendant at the time of the crime; 
(f) The defendant was an accomplice in the murder committed by 
another person and his participation was relatively minor; 
(g) And any other fact in mitigation of the penalty. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-207 (1982). The statute lists mitigating circumstances that may be 
presented at the penalty phase, if applicable. It does not anywhere include a fellow 
participant's degree of "moral culpability." 
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Tillman's counsel presented a mitigation case at the penalty phase. However, none 
of the mitigating circumstances specifically listed in the statute applied to Tillman. Tillman ( 
had a significant history of criminal activity since he had been convicted of seven prior 
felonies (R. 1935, 1939 & 1946). There was no evidence that Tillman was under the 
influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance at the time of the murder.14 Tillman 
did not act under extreme duress or under the substantial domination of another person. 
Tilhnan argues that the transcripts establish that "Sagers' role in committing the 
murder was greater than she admitted to" (brief, at 58). Tillman fails to present any evidence 
to support this allegation. The transcripts provide no new information that defense counsel 
did not already know as to what Sagers claimed she did during the murder. Even if Sagers' s 
participation in the murder was greater than she was willing to admit, there was no testimony, 
evidence or even any plausible inference that Tillman acted under Sagers's domination. 
As Tillman's wife acknowledged in her testimony at the penalty phase hearing, 
Tillman had the capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct and to conform his 
conduct to the law (R. 1922). There was no evidence that Tillman was impaired as a result 
of mental disease, intoxication, or influence of drugs. Tillman was not a youth. He was 47 
years old at the time of the murder (R. 1910). 
14
 Sagers mentioned in the transcripts that Tillman said it was either "him or me." 
Tillman argues that this might have provided grounds for a mitigation argument in the 
penalty phase. Tillman never raised this issue in the post-conviction case below. In 
addition, if Tillman felt suicidal, he certainly could have conveyed this information to his 
own counsel. 
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Tillman was not merely an accomplice to a murder committed by another and his 
participation was not minor. Even if Sagers's participation was greater than she was willing 
to admit, there was no testimony, evidence, or even any plausible inference that Tillman's 
participation was minor. Thirsk was asked at trial: "Did you ever reveal any information 
from Carla Sagers in your pre or posttest interview or polygraphs that would indicate she was 
the only one responsible for the killing of Mark Schoenfeld?" Thirsk answered "No." (R. 
1725). Tillman hit Mark Schoenfeld in the head with an ax, and then set his bed on fire. 
This is the picture that emerges from the transcripts, and it is the same picture painted at trial. 
CONCLUSION 
The post-conviction court erred in granting the petition for post-conviction relief 
because Tillman's Brady claim should be procedurally barred. Even if the claim is not 
procedurally barred, Tillman is not entitled to post-conviction relief because the partial 
polygraph interview transcripts do not meet the materiality prong of the Brady test. This 
Court should therefore reverse the district court's ruling granting the petition for post-
conviction relief as to Tillman's sentence. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / c l a y of June, 2004. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
y ^ c / ^ s /LXJC $ & 
ERIN RILEY 
THOMAS BRUNKER 
Assistant Attorneys General 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ELROY TILLMAN, 
Defendant. 
MOTION IN LIMINE RE: 
ADMISSION OF POLYGRAPH 
EVIDENCE 
Criminal No. CR82-1081 
The above-named defendant, by and through his counsel 
of record, hereby moves the Court to rule in advance of trial that 
evidence of polygraph examinations conducted upon or in connection 
with State witnesses be admissable for purposes of impeachment 
or rebuttal evidence. 
Dated this J2-Y day of December, 1982. 
BARBER, VERHOEF & YOCOM 
MARTIN VERHOEF 
Attorney for Defendan ? 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ELROY TILLMAN, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM RE ADMISSIBILITY 
AND USE OF POLYGRAPH EVIDENCE 
Criminal No. (31-82-1081 
Defendant, by and through his counsel, hereby submits 
his memorandum of authorities in support of defendant's motion 
seeking an order permitting the admission of polygraph evidence 
and expert testimony. 
FACTS 
The defendant stands charged with homicide, a capital 
offense, and is scheduled for trial on January 4, 1983. The 
prosecution's case apparently will be primarily predicated upon 
the testimony of one Carla Sagars who claims to have participated 
in or witnessed the crime. Her immunized testimony will be to 
the effect she accompanied defendant to the scene and witnessed 
v .• . . . . 
the murder by defendant. The witness denies- part icipat ing in any 
direct assault on the victim or causing the victim's death by any 
act. 4& 
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A number of polygraph examinations have been conducted, 
all without stipulation of any kind, which have led counsel to 
conclude, in conjunction with other evidence, the witnesses for 
the. state are deceptive in describing the events and circumstances 
surrounding the homicide. Furthermore, polygraph examination of 
defendant tends to indicate the defendant is truthful in denying 
he killed the victim. 
Counsel seeks admission of polygraph testimony tending 
to impeach state witnesses and/or supporting the credibility of 
defendant should he testify or supporting defendant's not guilty 
plea. 
I. DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO THE ADMISSION OF POLYGRAPH 
EXAMINATIONS UPON LAYING A PROPER FOUNDATION THEREFOR. 
Decisions of the Utah Supreme Court relative to the 
admission of expert testimony concerning the results of polygraph 
examinations imply that defendant may introduce such expert 
testimony provided sufficient foundation has been laid. 
In State v. Rowley, 386 P.2d 126 (Utah, 1963), 15 U.2d 
4, the Court dealt with an appeal based, inter alia, upon a failure 
to instruct the jury relative to the effect of a polygraph test 
when the results of the test were stimilfltprf tn h* a/*™* o c * M ^ 
The grounds for that appeal were deemed without merit on the 
grounds the defendant had not tendered an instruction relative 
to the polygraph and took no exception to the trial court's failure 
to give such an instruction. 386 P.2d at 128. 
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State v. Jenkins, 523 P.2d 1232 (Utah, 1974), was also 
a case wherein admissibility of polygraph evidence was stipulated 
to, hence, the Court did not discuss admission; however, the effect 
of the admission was as follows: 
When this evidence was received, it had 
the same status as any other evidence; that 
is, it was to be considered by the jury in 
connection with all of the other evidence in 
the case; and it was their prerogative to give 
it whatever credibility they thought it was 
e n t i t l e d to. (See § 7 7 - 2 4 - 1 , Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953; Peqpl e_y,.r._Chadwi ck , 2 5 P. 
73 7 , 7 Utah 134; and S^ t a Jt e_ v^_S c ojU , 447 
P.2d 908, 22 U.2d 27. Id. at 1234. 
In J.lHJilil 1 j the Court avoided the admissibility 
question, referring to cases of other jurisdictions at footnote 
6, 523 P.2d at 1234; however, the Utah Court, addressed the 
admissibility issue in State v. Abel, 600 P.2d 994 (Utah, 1979), 
wherein the State took the position that polygraph tests were of 
sufficient reliability to allow admission into evidence without 
a stipulation and in State v. Collins, 612 P.2d 775 (Utah, 1980), 
wherein the State took the contrary position. In Abel
 f the issue 
concerned the admissibility of a polygraph test over the objection 
of defendant. The Court observed three problems sufficient to 
warrant reversal existed; to wit: the stipulation of admissibility 
was not signed by both parties; the polygraph test administered 
to the complaining witness was inconclusive; and third, .no adequate 
foundation for the admission of the tests had been laid. With 
respect to the third point, the Court appeared willing to rule 
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d i r e c t l y on t h e a d m i s s i b i l i t y i s sue had the m a t t e r been submit ted 
wi th the proper r eco rd . In the Cour t T s words: 
T h i s b r i n g s us t o t h e t h i r d p o i n t . A 
l a r g e number of s t a t e s have r u l e d upon the 
a d m i s s i b i l i t y of l i e d e t e c t o r t e s t s , and most 
of t h e m h a v e e x c l u d e d t h o s e t e s t s from 
e v i d e n c e , a t l e a s t i n t h e a b s e n c e of a 
s t i p u l a t i o n . T h i s d o e s n o t , of c o u r s e , 
f o r e c l o s e t h i s C o u r t from r e a s s e s s i n g the 
q u e s t i o n of r e l i a b i l i t y and a d m i s s i b i l i t y of 
t h e t e s t . I t may w e l l be t h a t r e c e n t 
d e v e l o p m e n t s in t h i s a r e a of e n d e a v o r , as 
a r g u e d by the S t a t e , have p r o g r e s s e d to t h e 
p o i n t w h e r e p o l y g r a p h t e s t s s h o u l d be h e l d 
a d m i s s i b l e i r r e s p e c t i v e of a s t i p u l a t i o n . 
But in t h i s p a r t i c u l a r c a s e , we do not f i nd 
a s u f f i c i e n t f o u n d a t i o n in e i t h e r the b r i e f s 
o r t h e t e s t i m o n y i n t h e t r i a l c o u r t f o r 
a s s e s s i n g the r e l i a b i l i t y and p r o b a t i v e value 
of a p o l y g r a p h e x a m i n a t i o n g iven t h e a l l eged 
p e r p e t r a t o r of the crime to determine the i s sue 
of an a l l e g e d r ape v i c t i m ' s c o n s e n t . Id a t 
998. 
S t a t e v . C o l l i n s , s u p r a , fo l lowed s h o r t l y t h e r e a f t e r 
and a d d r e s s e d p o l y g r a p h a d m i s s i b i l i t y ; however , t h e p a r t i c u l a r 
f a c t s of t h e c a s e a g a i n p r e c l u d e d the Court from r u l i n g d i r e c t l y 
on t h e i s s u e . As w i t h A b e l , s u p r a , t h e r e c o r d in Col 1 ins was 
devo id of t h e f o u n d a t i o n a l r e q u i s i t e s needed by the Court to r u l e 
on t h e i s s u e . The Cour t d id a l l u d e to t h e f o u n d a t i o n r e q u i r e d 
a t 612 P.2d 778 as fo l lows : 
N e v e r t h e l e s s , i t i s impossible to address 
t h e i s s u e of t h e a d m i s s i b i l i t y of p o l y g r a p h 
r e s u l t s wi thout an adequate e v i d e n t i a r y r eco rd , 
i n c l u d i n g e x p e r t t e s t i m o n y which d e a l s w i t h 
such f a c t o r s as the v a l i d i t y of the under ly ing 
t h e o r y upon which p o l y g r a p h e x a m i n a t i o n s a r e 
b a s e d , t h e p r a c t i c a l a p p l i c a t i o n of t h o s e 
p r i n c i p l e s t o t h e i s s u e of d e t e c t i o n of 
f a b r i c a t i o n , t he v e r i f i a b i 1 i t y of p o l y g r a p h 
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LAKE CITY, 
test, and the problem whether successful 
deception of the polygraph can be accom-
plished. See, for example, Commonwealth_y. 
VlteU.0, M a s s . 381 N.E.2d 582 (1978). No 
such evidentiary foundation was adduced or 
proffered in the instant case. 
Based upon the foregoing cases, it appears that the law 
in Utah relative to polygraph evidence has yet to be defined or 
refined. Until the Utah Supreme Court is presented with an 
adequate record upon which to rule, polygraph evidence must be 
treated exactly like other expert opinion evidence subject to the 
rules of evidence concerning relevance, materiality, foundation, 
credentials of the expert, reliability of the process and the 
like. See, for example, United States v. Ridling, 350 F.Supp 
90 (E.D. Mich., 1972), and State v. Valdez, 91 Ariz. 274, 371 
P.2d 894 (Ariz., 1 9 6 2 ) , for a discussion of such evidentiary 
factors. 
Utah's Rules of Evidence, specifically Rules 46-48, 
permit opinion testimony of character and Rules 56-58 permit the 
opinion testimony of experts. These rules clearly permit the 
testimony of polygraph experts upon laying a proper foundation 
therefor. • 
Respectfully submitted this J3-& day of December, 1982. 
BARBER, VERHOEF & YOCOM 
MARTIN VERHOEF 
Attorney for Defendant 
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DELIVERY CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Memorandum Re Admissibility and Use of Polygraph Evidence 
was hand delivered to Michael Christensen, Deputy County Attorney, 
431 South 300 East, Second Floor, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, on 
this £?/ day of December, 1982. 
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TELEPHONE 
JAMES N. BARBER 
MARTIN VERHOEF 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
Attorneys for Defendant 
BARBER, VERHOEF & YOCOM 
Suite 100 
255 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 355-8998 
£ftSfi* 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ELROY TILLMAN, 
Defendant. 
DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
Criminal No. CR-82-1081 
The d e f e n d a n t , E l r o y T i l l m a n , by and through h i s 
a t t o r n e y s of record , James N. Barber, Martin Verhoef and David 
E. Yocom, h e r e b y r e q u e s t s that t h i s Court g i v e the f o l l o w i n g 
i n s t r u e t i o n s , numbered 1 through , i n c l u s i v e , in i t s charge 
to the jury. . 
Dated this day of January, 1983. 
•' BARBER, VERHOEF <Sc YOCOM 
JAMES N. BARBER 
torney for Defendant 
Attorney for Defendant 
•r,.-
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} 
I hereby certify I received a copy of the foregoing Plaintiff's 
Requested Jury Instructions this day of January, 1983. 
JIM BERBER DAVID YOCUM 
Attorney for Defendant Attorney for Defendant 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
> . ) 
INSTRUCTION NO. _ _ _ _ _ 
The defendant has entered a plea of not guilty to the charge 
of Criminal Homicide, Murder, First Degree, a Capital Offense, as 
contained in the Information. By the plea of not guilty the de-
fendant denies each and every one of the essential elements of the 
charge, which elements are as follows: 
1. That on or about May 26, 1982, in Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah, the defendant, Elroy Tillman, caused the death of Mark 
Schoenfeld; and 
2. That he acted intentionally or knowingly in causing the 
death of Mark Allen Schoenfeld; and 
3. That at the time the homicide was committed, the defen-
dant was engaged in the commission of, or attempting to commit 
burglary or aggravated burglary, and/or arson or aggravated arson. 
If you find the State has proven beyond a reasonable doubt 
each and every one of these elements, then it is your duty to find 
the defendant guilty of the offense of Criminal Homicide, Murder m*+<j 
First Degree, a Capital Offense. On the other hand, if you find 
the State has failed to prove any of these elements beyond a reason-
able doubt then you flME find the defendant"SB^ guilty of the offense 
of Criminal Homicide, Murder, First Degree, a Capital Offense, and 
you may then consider the lesser include^d offense of Criminal Homi-
cide, Murder in the Second Degree, a first degree felony. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT (10 >WLM 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE- OF UTAH 
-00O00-
THE STATE OF UTAH, ) 
) 
Plaintiff,) 
) 
vs. ) 
) 
ELROY TILLMAN, ) 
) 
Defendant.) 
1 i \ 
Criminal No. 82-1081 
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT ON APPEAL 
January 20, 19 83 
BEFORE THE HONORABLE ERNEST F. BALDWIN, JR., 
District Court Judge 
A P P E A R A N C E S : 
For the S ta te of Utah: MICHAEL CHRISTENSEN 
VIRGINIA CHRISTENSEN 
Deputy County Attorneys 
431 South 300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
For the Defendant: 
FH.EO IN CLERK'S OFRCS 
m Ukt County Utah 
NOV 211983 
JAMES BARBER 
MARTIN VERHOEF 
DAVID YOCOM 
Attorneys at Law 
255 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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J a n u a r y 2 0 , 19 83 
— qoOoq-* 
THE COURT: Case No., CR-82-1081, t h e S t a t e of 
Utah v . E l r o y T i l l m a n . The r e c o r d may show a l l 12 j u r o r s 
a r e p r e s e n t i n t h e b o x , t h e d e f e n d a n t i s p r e s e n t w i t h 
c o u n s e l , t h e S t a t e i s p r e s e n t by i t s c o u n s e l . 
I n t h i s m a t t e r t h e f i r s t phase of t h i s a c t i o n ! 
i 
having been held, and the jury having returned a verdict onj 
! 
the 14th of January, 1983, "We the jurors empaneled in the 
above case find the defendant Elroy Tillman guilty of 
criminal homicide,-murder in the first degree, a capital 
offense as charged in the information," 
Pursuant to the provisions of the statutes and 
the laws of the State of Utah, it is provided that when the 
defendant has been found guilty of a capital felony there 
shall be further proceedings before the Court or jury on thi 
issue of penalty. Said procedings shall be conducted befor^ 
the Court or jury wrhich found the defendant guilty. 
In these proceedings evidence may be presented 
a§ t© any matter which the Court deems: relevant td sentence ,| 
including but noil limited to th£ nature and circumstances 
of the crime £ th§ defendant's character, his background, 
his history* his mental* and physical condition and any otheij; 
facts in aggravation oil mitigation of the penalty* 
And any evidence the Court deems to have 
1 PJ1A 
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i probative force may be received regardless of its 
2
 admissibility under the exclusive rules — Exclusionary 
3
 Rules of Evidence, The State's attorney and the defendant 
* shall be permitted to present arguments for or against the 
5
 sentence of death. The aggravating circumstances are those 
6
 as set forth by the statute and mitigating circumstances ar 
7
 as set forth by law and the defendant may be allowed to 
8 present certain mitigating circumstances, I will give you 
9
 instructions on what those specifically are, 
10 It's for the jury to decide pursuant to the 
11 provisions of law whether the penalty of life imprisonment 
12 shall be imposed or whether the death penalty shall be 
13 imposed and, in addition, with the rules of law that I shal 
14 give to you in connection with this matter. In connection 
15 with the matter, I shall give the State the privilege, the 
16 right to make an opening statement, if the State so desires 
17 MR. CHRISTENSEN: The State at this time, 
18
 your Honor, waives openingr statement. 
19 THE COURT: Or give the defendant the right 
20 to make an opening statement, if the defendant so-desires, 
21 Mr. Barber? 
22 MR, BARBER: The defendant alsq* will waive 
23 that right, your Honor, and suggest that we proceed with 
24 the evidence, 
25 THE COURT: All right. You may proceed, 
1865 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Mr. Christensen, with whatever evidence you have as to the 
aggravating or the mitigating circumstances; if you so . 
desire. 
MR. CHRISTENSEN:1 Thank you, your Honor. 
The State has two witnesses they will call 
that are Charles Is Hey and Terry Bailey/ We would ask 
they be sworn. 
Would you step forward, please? 
[Whereupon, the witnesses were sworn by the 
clerk.J 
THE COURT: All right, gentlemen, you have 
been sworn in this matter. I would request -- which one 
will you call first? 
MR. CHRISTENSEN:. Officer Charles Illsley, 
your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. The other gentleman 
will remain outside the courtroom during the testimony of 
the first witness and I would— 
MPL BARBER: Your Honor, in respect of that, 
we would be willing to waive the exclusionary rule, as I 
think it would have no prejudice to have the witnesses 
present if they would prefer to do that. 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: I would prefer they remain 
outside, your Honor, 
THE COURT: Outside? 
1 RRfl 
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;MK; CHRISTENSEN: Yes. 
THE COURT: All right. The witness may 
remain outside while the other individual testifies, 
CHARLES ILLSLEY, 
a witness called by the State of Utah, having been duly 
sworn,, was examined and testified on his oath as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR, CHRISTENSEN; 
Qt Officer Illsley, will you state your full 
name, please, 
A. Charles Illsley, I-1-l-s-l-e-y• 
Qt And your occupation, please, 
A. I am a sergeant with West Valley City Police 
Department, 
Q. , And have you as a result of contacts with 
members of the County Attorney's Office been required to 
investigate and pursue the alleged criminal background of 
Mr, Elroy Tillman? 
A. Yes, sir, I have, -
Q. Have you also had occasion to be schooled 
in and to undergo various professional training in the art 
of fingerprint, latent fingerprint and other types of 
fingerprint technology and training? 
h Yes, I have. 
5 
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gt And would you describe briefly for the Court 
your qualifications respecting that? 
k In 19 81 I attended the basic fingerprint j 
school with the Department of Justice in Sacramento, I 
California, In 19 82 I attened the advanced latent fingerprint 
school the Department of Justice, Sacramento, California/ 
In 19 82 I attended the FBI advanced latent 
fingerprint school, Salt Lake City, Utah, and in September of 
1982 I attended the FBI academy in Quantico, Virginia for 
three weeks, 
Q. Have you been qualified as a fingerprint expert 
in both the Third Judicial District of Salt Lake County as 
well as the Fifth Circuit Court of Salt Lake County? 
A. Yes, sir, I have, 
Q. Have, you had occasion to so qualify and 
testify in the past regarding fingerprint expertise? 
A. Yes, sir, I have, 
Qt Jf you would, Officer Illsley, describe for 
the Court and the jury what procedure you used in compiling 
coordinating the criminal background of Mr, Elroy Tillman, 
JL I contacted the FBI and asked them to verify 
a record to Mr, Tillman and had them send me fingerprint 
q^rds that they had on file, 
I then contacted the Oklahoma State Prison, 
the California Department of Corrections, the California 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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1
 Department of Justice Fingerprint Section, the Tulsa, 
2
 County Superior Court, Los Angeles County Superior Courtf 
3
 San Bernardino County Superior Court, and obtained records 
4
 from all those agencies, 
5
 Q. In so doing, Officer Illsley, did you request 
6
 and receive what is characterized as exemplified copies of 
7
 each of the convictions and judgments of Mr. Tillman on his 
8 past criminal record? 
9
 -hi Yes, sir, I did. 
10 Q. In so doing, did you have occasion to receive 
11 both fingerprint cards from those various institutions 
12 pursuant to that record and compare those records or cross-
13 examine those received and housed at the National Crime 
14 Center, the Federal Bureau of Investigation? 
15 A. Yes, sir, I did? 
16 Qt In so doingf were you able to, in each 
17 instance, to match and verify the fingerprints as received 
18 and on file with those two agencies? 
19 A. . Yes, sir, I was • 
20 MR, BARBER: Your Honor, at this point we will 
21 object to the foundation in terms of the qualifications of 
22 the witness and suggest that all testimony from him about 
23 fingerprint analysis be suppressed on that basis• 
24 THE COURT: You may proceed, Mr, Christensen 
25 Qt CBy -Mr. Christensen) Thank you, your Honor, 
7; 
r 1 fcPSt 
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THE COURT: At this time and state of the 
record, 
Q. (By Mr, Christensen) Thank you. 
Did you have occasion also to personally 
j 
fingerprint Mr. Elroy Tillman? j 
A. Yes, sir, I did, ' j 
Ql And do you know the date that that took place^ 
A. Yesf sir, 
Qt And i s Mr. Tillman that you fingerprinted 
known by the name of Elroy Tillman present in court at 
this time? . 
A, Yes, s i r , he i s , 
Ql Would you point him out, please? 
A. He's standing at the defense table wearing 
a brown jacket, light colored shirt, 
Ql Once you obtained the fingerprint documents 
from Mrv Tillman, did you then compare and cross-compare 
and recheck and reverify the fingerprints received from 
Mr, Tillman and those records received from the various 
institutions that you contacted? 
A. Yes, sir, I did. 
Ql And in so doing, what were your findings 
respecting Mr, Tillman's fingerprints versus those that were) 
exemplified and certified as sent to you? 
A* The fingerprints that I examined from the 
1370 
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various agencies and the fingerprints that I personally 
took from the defendant, Elroy Tillman, were made by the 
same fingers , . 
QL Were there arrr differences that you noted 
whatsoever on any of the records that you received in the 
course of your investigation? 
A.> -No, s i r . 
Qi I will show ycu what I have asked to be 
marked as State's Exhibit 1 and ask you, if you will, to 
identify that document in tenns of when i t was received by 
you and from which institution i t was received. 
A. This was received by me on January 4, 19 8 3 
from the District Court of rulsa County in Oklahoma, 
QL And did you cneck and verify that particular 
record against fingerprints on file and in conjunction with 
the FBi and your personal printing of Mr. Tillman? 
A. , Yes, s i r , I did, 
Ql Is this an exemplified copy of that 
particular agency? 
A. Yes, s i r , i t i s . 
Qt Did you have personal contact with that 
department for purposes of obtaining that record and receive^ 
and maintain that document in your custody prior to coming 
to tr ial? 
A* Yes, s i r , I did. 
\ 
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Q, I will show you State's Exhibit 2 and ask you 
to identify that document,. 
A* This is an exemplified copy of a conviction . 
that I obtained on January 4, 19 83 from the District Court 
of Tulsa County, Oklahoma. 
Q, And in light of the questions I have 
previously asked you, did you compare the fingerprints with 
respect to that document and maintain that document in youf 
custody pending this trial today? 
A, Yes, sir, I did, 
Q. And did you also have contact with an agency 
regarding that document throughout the course of your 
investigation? 
A. Yesf sir, 
Qi I will have you identify State's Exhibit 3. 
A. This is an exemplified copy of a conviction 
record that I personally obtained January 4, 1983 from the 
District Court, Tulsa County, Oklahoma. 
Q. All right. On each of the exhibits, State's 
1, 2 and 3, are they all separate convictions and separate 
dates Qn those documents? 
MR* BARBER: Your Honor, once again I will 
object and ask the word "conviction" in the prior two answer^ 
and Mr, Christensen's question be stricken because I believ^ 
thereisrft sufficient foundation for the use of the term and 
10 
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the introduction of the documents without which it is 
improbable to refer to the same as such, 
i 
THE COURT: I will strike the word "conviction" 
until we get the documents in. 
MR. BARBER: May the jury be instructed to 
disregard that at this point? 
THE COURT: The jury will disregard the word 
"conviction," 
ft (By Mr, Christensen) I will have you ; 
identify State's Exhibit 4, if youwould, please, 
A. This is a court document that I received on 
January 1, 19 83 from the Superior Court of Los Angeles \ 
County, California. 
ft And is that also an exemplified document of 
that particular record? 
: 
I 
A. Yes, sir, it is, ! 
ft And did you maintain that in your custody and; 
safekeeping during the time you received it? j 
A. Yes', s i r , ! 
I ft And were you a l s o in pe r sona l c o n t a c t wi th 
t h e people r e s p o n s i b l e for sending you t h a t document? 
A. Yes f s i r , 
ft I w i l l have you; i d e n t i f y S t a t e ' s E x h i b i t 5. 
A. This i s an exempli f ied copy of a c o u r t documeijit 
I r ece ived on January 11 f 19 8 3 from t h e Superior Court of 
Hi 
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California, County of Sari Bernardino, j 
Qt And likewise with that document, did you ! 
receive that and maintain it in your custody and make no 
alterations or other types of entries on that particular ! 
exhibit other than to mark it for purposes of your evidence? 
A. Yes, sir, 
Qt And were you also in contact with the people 
originating this document to you? 
A. Yes, s i r . 
Qt I will have you identify State's Exhibit 6. 
A. This is an exemplified copy of a court 
document from the UV S. District Court Southeastern District 
of California, San Diego, I received it on January 4, 19 83 
and it is exemplified, 
Qt And same question with regard to that. Did 
you maintain it in your custody and safekeeping and were 
you also in contact with the personnel of the department 
that originated this particular document? 
A. Yes, sir, 
QL State's Exhibit 7, if you would identify that. 
A.(Vr This is a set of fingerprints that I personally 
took from the defendant, Elroy Tillman, on November 30, 1982. 
Qt And are those accurate reproductions of the 
fingerprints taken or the original fingerprint card of 
Mr, Tillman? 
12 
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A. Yes, sir, 
QL Has that also been maintained in your 
safekeeping and custody pending these proceedings here 
today? 
A. Yes, sir, it has. 
Q. On any of these exhibits, Officer Illsley, 
did your other than marking them for evidence to identify 
their receipt by you, make any alterations or changes 
in them or transpose any of the items of information 
contained therein? 
A.. No, sir, 
Q, You indicated tha t you also contacted the 
FBI regarding information on f i l e with tha t agency. Did yoiji 
have occasion to receive documents from them purporting to 
be the cr iminal h i s t o r y of Mr, Tillman? 
A. Yes, s i r , I d id , 
Qt In reviewing that document and comparing that 
with the documents you received from the individual 
institutions involved, did you find any descrepancy with 
the entries contained with the FBI? 
MR. BARBER: Objection, your Honor, That 
question is based on a reference to a hearsay document 
which is inadmissible, We do not have the document in 
evidence, 
THE COURT: It will be sustained at this time] 
13 
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MR. CHRISTENSEN: At t h i s t ime, your Honor, 
s u b j e c t to our arguments o u t s i d e the presence of the j u r y , 
I would offef S t a t e ' s E x h i b i t s 1 through 7 and ask th£ 
Court t # t ake j u d i c i a l n d t i c € of th§ exemplif ied documents 
pu r suan t to t he Rules of Evidence* 
TEE COURT: Have you seen these documents, 
Mr, Barber? 
MR, BARBER: I have not, your Honor, We w i l l 
o b j e c t t o t h e i r admiss ion on v a r i o u s grounds and do concur 
wi th t h e p r o s e c u t o r , perhaps t h e argument shcruld be he ld 
o u t s i d e the p resence of the j u r y . 
THE COURT: A l l r i g h t . I w i l l wi thhold 
r u l i n g on those m a t t e r s , 
MR, BARBER: Thank you, 
QL (By Mr, Ch r i s t en sen l Did you a l s o , 
Of f i ce r I l l s l e y , have occas ion to prepare a char t , which i s 
b a s i c a l l y a t i n e chart* comparing the var ious documents t h a t 
have been in t roduced , comparing them to a r e l e v a n t f i nge rp r i i i t 
of the i n d i v i d u a l and t h e t ime t h a t t he p a r t i c u l a r document^ 
i n d i c a t e t he f i n g e r p r i n t was taken? 
A, Yes, s i r , I d i d , 
Ql And t h e purpose for t h a t f i n g e r p r i n t ? 
A, Yes, s i r . 
Q. Bo yoii have t h a t wi th you now? 
A. Yes, s i r „ 
14 
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QL Without opening that document, Officer Ills ley, 
will you identify that particular exhibit for the Court and 
jury? 
A, State's Exhibit No. 8 is a fingerprint 
comparison chart that I personally prepared. 
QL And does it accurately contain all the 
items of information contained in the exhibits that have 
been previously marked as State's Exhibits 1 through 6? 
A. Yes, sir, it does, 
MR. CHRITENSEN: At this time, your Honor, 
1 would offer State's Exhibit 8 as well, subject to arguments 
outside the presence of the jury. : 
MR, BARBER: We'll object to the admission 
of the document and might I voir dire for clarification, 
your Honor? 
THE COURT: Yes, sir, you may. 
VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION 
BY MR, BARBER: 
Ql I t h i n k you i n d i c a t e d t h e number of t h a t 
document i s E x h i b i t 8? 
. A. T h a t ' s t h e number t h a t i s on t h e e x h i b i t . 
QL • And —- t h a t may b e d i f f e r e n t , I t h o u g h t you 
s a i d t h e f i n g e r p r i n t s h e e t t h a t you h a d i d e n t i f i e d 
p r e v i o u s l y was E x h i b i t 8; Have I — 
.o 
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MR. CHRISTENSEN: That was 7 . 
v 
THE CLERK: This was 7, 
MR. BARBER: All right. Thank you. 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: I have nothing further of 
this witness, your Honor. Subject to the introduction of 
the evidence. 
THE COURT: Mr, Barber? 
MR, BARBER: I have no questions. 
THE COURT: Fine. Thank you, sir. You may 
step down. 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: State would call 
Terry Bailey to the stand, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Has No, 8 left here? 
MR, CHRISTENSEN: It is, 
THE COURT: All right. 
WILLIAM T. BAILEY, 
a witness called by the State of Utah, having been duly 
sworn, was examined and testified on his oath as follows: 
MR, CHRISTENSEN: Your Honor, I might indicat^ 
for the record and pursuant to federal regulations involving 
privacyf Mr, Terry Bailey is a federal employee working 
for the probation and parole department and that pursuant 
to the federal regulations involving their testimony, he 
must Be ordered by the Court to answer my questions 
I6 
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respecting that privacy, and I would ask the Court at this 
time to so instruct Mr, Bailey. It's a formality that 
must be engaged in for his protection. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. BARBER: I have no objection if he is 
also instructed to answer mine. j 
THE COURT:' All right, sir. Would you then i 
in" connection with the — those questions that are germane, j 
relative and to this proceeding, sir, answer the questions 
put to you by Mrt Christensen or Mr. Barber as they may be 
relevant and material to the issues before the Court at 
this time, sir? 
THE WITNESS: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
MR, CHRISTENSEN: I might indicate for the 
record he is responding to a subpoena duly issued by the 
State of Utah. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR, CHRISTENSEN: 
Q. Officer Bailey, will you state your full name 
and occupation, pleasef 
A. William Terry Bailey, United States Probation 
Officer for the District of Utah. 
17 
1S73 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Qt And how long have you been a probation office^ 
with the District of Utah? 
A. A little over four years, 
ft And prior to that what was your occupation? 
A. . I was a psychiatric social worker for the 
Weber County Mental Health Department. 
Qt Did you have occasion to meet and become 
acquainted with the person by the name of Elroy Tillman? 
A. Yes. 
Qt And is he present in court at this time? 
A. Yes, he is. 
Qt Would you point him out, please, for the 
record? 
& Right here, 
Qt And when did you first have the occasion to 
meet Mr. Tillman? 
A. In approximately mid-19 80 upon his release to 
a halfway house from a federal institution, 
Qt Were you personally assigned his custody, 
care and parole supervision pursuant to that release? 
A. Yes, on 9-5-80 he was released to a special 
parole term from the halfway house, 
Qt Would you describe for the jury and the Court 
what procedures you follow when you receivei an inmate for 
purposes of parole, what special instructions you gave to 
18 
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Mr. Tillman regarding that, and what agreements he agreed 
to abide fay in the course of that parole? 
MR. BARBER: Objection, relevance, your 
Honor. Also calls for hearsay. 
THE COURT: He may answer, 
THE WITNESS: At the time an individual is 
released or comes into — under my supervision, if he has 
not received his certificate of parole or not executed 
that, then we usually have him execute it and go over those 
conditions with him. 
If he has executed it by the time he comes 
into my supervision, we will reiterate and go over those 
conditions, 
QL All right. And if you would, describe for us 
what a parole certificate is. 
X Parole certificate is a certificate issued 
to an individual once he is granted parole or special 
parole and outlines — he signs it, outlines conditions of 
that parole, and he signs that document acknowledging his 
understanding of these conditions. 
QL Are there any restrictions placed on a parole 
in terms of what he can and can't do? 
A. Yes, there are. 
QL Would you describe those, please? 
A. Bas ica l ly an individual who i s on paro le or 
19 
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special parole has the responsibility to report to his 
supervisor, which would be myself in this case, when directed 
He would -- he is to submit monthly written reports and 
report to me as indicated on approximately a month-to-
monthly basis. 
He is not to violate any law nor associate 
with persons engaged in criminal activity. He is to work 
regularly at a lawful occupation to support his legal 
dependants to the best of his ability, if any. He shall 
not drink any alcoholic beverages in excess or use, possess 
in his possession any marijuana, narcotic, dangerous 
drug or habit-forming drug without benefit of prescription 
from a licensed physician. 
He is! not to associate with invididuals known 
to be in criminal activity and shall not possess firearms 
or any dangerous weapons in his possession, 
Qt- Is he authorized to purchase firearms during 
this special parole? 
A. No, not without permission of the United 
States Probation Office or United States Parol Commission, 
Qt Is he authorized to maintain explosives? 
A* No, he is not, 
Qt And you i n d i c a t e d o the r types of weapons. 
What would t h a t mean? 
A. Dangerous weapons would mainly be your 
20 
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firearms, explosives, anything to do in that nature. 
Q. Did Mr. Tillman at any time he was on parole 
to you, have any special permission granted him to purchase[ 
own or have in his possession any firearms of any kind? j 
MR, BARBER: Objection. May I voir dire? j 
i 
THE COURT: Yes, sir, 
VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION 
BY MR. BARBER: 
Qt It is not your office that would be obliged 
to give that permission during that period of time, would 
i t be? 
JL I t would b e t h r o u g h my o f f i c e w i t h t h e 
Uni t ed S t a t e s P a r o l e Commiss ion , 
QL But ATF would a l s o b e e n t i t l e d t o b e i n t h a t 
s i t u a t i o n , would i t n o t ? 
k I t i s my u n d e r s t a n d i n g an i n d i v i d u a l which 
i s c o n v i c t e d of a f e l o n y c a n n o t — we c a n n o t g r a n t him 
r e l i e f from t h a t , i t h a s t o be g r a n t e d t h r o u g h t h e ATF, 
y e s , s i r . 
DIRECT EXAMINATION [ c o n t i n u e d ! 
BY MR, CHRISTENSEN: 
Q. Did you e v e r s e e any p e r m i s s i o n be g r a n t e d 
t h r o u g h ATF o r b e n o t i f i e d o f t h a t f a c t ? 
21 
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A. No, n o t a t any t i m e , 
ft Did you have a t e r m i n a t i o n d a t e of Mr. T i l l m a n ' s 
p a r o l e when he would go off p a r o l e ? 
L . He was s c h e d u l e d t o b e r e l e a s e d oh 9 - 5 - 8 2 . 
ft 9 -5 of ' 82? 
k Y e s , s i r . 
MR. CHRIS TENS EN: I h a v e no f u r t h e r q u e s t i o n s 
of t h i s w i t n e s s , your Honor . 
THE COURT: Mr, B a r b e r ? 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. BARBER: 
ft As of t h e d a t e May 26 o f 1982, i t i s t r u e , 
i s i t n o t , t h a t y o u r o f f i c e had made no move toward c a l l i n g 
t h e a t t e n t i o n of t h e c o u r t t o any m i s c o n d u c t o r d i f f i c u l t i e s 
w i t h Mr. T i l l m a n fo r t h e p u r p o s e of r e v o k i n g h i s p a r o l e ? 
A. T h a t ' s t r u e . 
Ql At t h a t p o i n t i n t i m e h e was s t i l l on p a r o l e 
i n good s t a n d i n g ; i s t h a t c o r r e c t ? 
A. Yes • 
MR. BARBER: Thank y o u . 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: No f u r t h e r q u e s t i o n s , your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: Fine. Thank you, sir, 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: Thank you. Subject to the 
22 
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introduction of the documents, your Honor, the State rests. 
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Barber? 
MR. BARBER: Your Honor, might I ask the 
Court's indulgence and perhaps we could argue the situation 
involving the exhibits and have just a moment to marshal 
our witnesses, 
, THE COURT: All right, sir. 
MR. BARBER: And perhaps ten minutes. 
THE COURT: All right, sir. Do yo-u want to 
recess now for ten, you say? 
MR. BARBER: I would appreciate that, your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. Ladies and gentlemen 
of the jury, at the request of counsel, they Lave requested 
a recess of ten minutes and I will grant that request, 
again with my admonition as before, speak to no one, let 
no one speak to yoii and don't make up your minds concerning 
the matter, the issues now before the court, and remain 
together, and I will excuse the jury for ten minutes to go 
to the jury room. 
[Whereupon, the jury left the courtroom.] 
THE COURT: Do you want to meet with your 
witnesses now, Mr. Barber? 
MR. BARBER: If 1 may, your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. We'll be in recess 
23 
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for ten minutes. 
[Short recess.] 
THE COURT: The record may show all 12 
jurors are present. Defendant is present with counsel. 
The State is present with counsel. 
You may proceed, Mr. Barber. 
MR. BARBER: Thank you, your Honor. With the 
Court's permission, we would call Rosco Fowler to the 
stand. 
ROSCO FOWLER, 
a witness called by the defendant, having been duly sworn, 
was examined and testified on his oath as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. BARBER: 
Will you state your name for the jury and the 
Rosco Fowler. 
And where do you reside? 
Los Angeles, California, 
Why don't you --
THE COURT: Pull the microphone over in front 
CBy Mr. Barber) How old are you, sir? 
24 
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A. 34 y e a r s o l d , 
ft And a r e you employed? 
A. Y e s , I am, 
ft And what do you do? 
A. I am —• I work as a special effects man for 
Universal Studios. 
ft And that is in Los Angeles, California? 
A. Yes, it is* 
ft Sir, do you know the defendant, 
Mr, Elroy Tillman? 
JL Yes, I do, 
ft Can you i d e n t i f y him a s b e i n g i n t h e court rooi j i? 
A. Y e s , I can? He i s the g e n t l e m a n s t a n d i n g u p , 
now he i s s i t t i n g , 
ft A l l r i g h t . What i s t h e n a t u r e o f your 
r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h , him? 
A. W e l l , a b r o t h e r , 
ft He i s y o u r b r o t h e r ? 
A, B r o t h e r f f a t h e r and a l l of i t , y e s , 
ft I s h e bld-ex? o r younger t h a n you? 
K He i s o l d e r , 
ft By how f a r ? 
A. A b o u t 10 y e a r s , 
ft And so I t a k e i t you have known him a l l you r 
n a t u r a l l i f e , 
. ' • _ _ 2 5 
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k Yes, I have. 
ft Where were you born. 
k Oklahoma, Tulsa. 
ft And was Elroy also borii in Oklahoma? 
k Yes. 
ft And where in Tulsa did you reside? Was it 
in the city or in a rural area? 
A. Oh, city. We stayed in Oklahoma a little 
while then came to California when 1 was young. 
ft All right. Do you know how old you were and 
how old Elroy was approximately when you moved from 
Oklahoma to California? 
L Oh, about 10 years old, 
ft You were 10? 
i* Yes, 
ft And Elroy would have been somewhat o l d e r 
than that? 
k 
ft 
A. 
ft 
A, 
d e c e a s e d , 
ft 
fami ly? 
Y e s , 
Do you have o t h e r b r o t h e r s and s i s t e r s ? 
Y e s , I do . 
How many and what are their relative ages? 
I have five brothers and two sisters, one 
So there were a total of eight children in thd 
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1
 • * • .
 Y e s
* 
2 ft Did you r e s i d e w i t h your mother i n Oklahoma 
3 and California? 
4
 K Yes, I did. 
5 ft And did you reside with your father? 
6 A. No, I didn't. 
7 ft I s t h e r e any t ime during your l i f e or E l r o y ' s 
8 l i f e that either of you resided with your natural father? 
9 A. No, 
10 ft A l l r i g h t . Mr. Fowler , as you a r e w e l l 
11 aware, your brother, Mr. Tillman, is on trial here for his 
12 l i f e , and the purpose of this proceedings i s to aid the 
13 Ju^y in determining which of the two permissible penalties 
14 should be imposed. The penalty of l i f e imprisonment or the 
15 penalty of death by shooting, which i s authorized by our 
16 legislature, 
17 MR, CHRISTENSEN: I w i l l o b j e c t , your Honor. 
18 I t ' s a misstatement of the law. 
19 THE COURT: You may proceed , Mr, Barber, 
20 MR, BARBER: Thank you , your Honor. 
21 ft CBy Mr, Barber) Do you have a p r e f e r e n c e a s 
22 between those two penalties as they relate to your brother, 
23 Elroy Tillman? 
24 A* Y e s , I d o . 
25 ft And what do you believe is the better of the 
27 
1SS9 i 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
two alternatives? 
( MR/ CHRISTENSEN: Same objection, your Honor. 
Itfs irrelevant, 
THE COURT: He may answer, 
Qt (By Mr* Barber) And I will provide foundatioiji 
your Honor
 t 
A. Life imprisonment, third would be freedom, 
you know, 
Q. All right. What is it that makes you state 
to this Court and jury that life imprisonment is a better 
and more appropriate penalty, if that's your position, than 
the death penalty, Mr, Fowler? 
K Well, I think all men should be judged by 
God and not by one another. ' 
Qt Can you tell me something about your brother, 
if there is anything that causes you to express that 
opinion? What was the nature of his relationship to you? 
k Well, my older brother and I have always — 
my brother has never harmed me in no way. He has always 
been good to me and my family and, like I say, he is just 
not a brother, he has been a father, tod, you knew. 
Qt Did the absence of the father in the home 
reflect itself in his role as a brother? 
A. Yes. 
Qt Was he the oldest of al l the children? 
28 
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1
 k No, 
2 ft Were t h e r e o l d e r c h i l d r e n ? 
3 k Y e s , t h e r e w a s , 
4
 ft Did any of them take responsibilities in the 
5 home that would otherwise perhaps have fallen to the fatherf 
6 k Y e s . 
7 ft And d i d E lroy do tha t? 
8 k Y e s . 
9 QL A l l r i g h t . Have you had the o p p o r t u n i t y over 
10 the years t o o b s e r v e h i s c h a r a c t e r i n r e s p e c t o f h p n e s t y 
M and be ing s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d ? 
12 *• Yes. 
13 ft Do you have an opinion about that — his 
14 traits in that respect from your long association with him? 
15 k Yes, I do. 
16 ft And what i s t h a t op in ion? 
17 k I put my l i f e i n h i s h a n d s / m y f a m i l y ' s 
18 l i f e . 
19 ft Are you aware of h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h your 
20 o ther b r o t h e r s and s i s t e r s and your mother? 
21 k Y e s . 
22 I ft I s your mother s t i l l a l i v e ? 
23 | k Y e s f s h e i s • 
24 | ft How o l d i s s h e ? 
25 I k S h e ' s 6 7 . 
29 
<* «5<S< M 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
.1 
A. Okay. Would you tell me about the nature of 
Elroy's relationship to his other family members and your 
mother? 
A. Well, we have been -- my mother — she taught 
us always to depend upon one another, you know, as a family 
unit and, you know, like we could look to one another for 
help and like I said, we were always, you know, close when 
we were around, you know, when Elroy was around. 
(X All rightf Now, in 19 82 did you have the 
occasion to have conversations with Elroy? 
A. Yes, I did. 
51 In respect of your relationship as a brother 
to him? 
A, Yes, 
Q. When did those conversations in 19 82 begin? 
A. Well, in 1982, I can't pinpoint days and 
hours and, you know '-*• 
QL Indeed, Erut generally speaking, vas it early 
OX late in the year? 
A. It was first part of the year, about March or 
April ,•. 
Q All right. And as a result of those 
qgnyersations you had with Elroy, did yoii have the occasion 
to haye a meeting with him? 
A* Yes, I did, 
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ft And where did that meeting occur? 
A Here in Utah. Members! of my family came up 
and spent some time with Elroy, 
(X Why was it you did that? 
A Well, he had called and said he had trouble, 
he felt that his life was being threatened and we came out. 
Q. And during the course of your — how long 
did you stay? 
A We stayed a week, 
Qt And during the course of your conversations 
with him, did you discuss his plans for the future and what 
he ought to do about the problems he was having? 
A. Yes, we did, 
Q. And in connection with those discussions, 
what did he express to you as his desires in those respects'] 
A Well, at the time we felt that, you know, he 
needed what you say, a getaway periodT He came back to 
California for a week, We stayed a week, he came back with 
us, you know, we made arrangements for him to come back. 
He stayed with the family for a week and visited, you know, 
all the family and, you know, and like I said, you know, 
we all got together and we had a good time. And he was 
talking about coming back to California and staying when, 
you knowf when he got off of parole. 
QL Did he express whether he was happy in Utah? 
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K 
\ & 
A. 
. he f e l t he 
No, he w a s n ' t . 
What d id he say about t h a t ? 
Wel l , he j u s t s a id t h a t th ings h e r e , you knowL 
had been manipula ted in coming to Utah and he 
wished he h a d n ' t . 
ft 
A. 
ft 
A. 
ft 
t hose t h a t 
A. 
By whom; d id he say? 
Yes, he d i d , 
Who d id he say had been r e spons ib l e for t h a t ? 
Was i t , what , Mickey, as I know her name a s . 
Okay, And d id he express any p l ans o the r than 
you have a l r e a d y r e l a t e d to us? 
J u s t t o , you know, come back wi th t h e family, 
t h a t ' s about i t . 
ft 
A. 
ft 
A. 
• ft 
A. 
& 
A. 
ft 
A. 
Okay, I s Elroy married, t o your knowledge? 
Yes 
And t o whom i s he married? • 
7o Dor i s T i l lman . 
Does he have any ch i ld ren? 
Yes . 
And how many c h i l d r e n does he have? 
Two, 
And what a re t h e i r naises? 
One i s Elroy Til lman and then t h e r e i s — 
then I have ano the r nephew, I am t r y i n g to th ink of h i s f u l l 
name, Al l I know him by h i s nickname " I r v i n , " 
• . . 32.[ 
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Q. And i s he E l r o y ' s c h i l d by the same woman who 
i s the mother of Elroy? 
A. No. 
QI How old is young Elroy? 
A. Elroy is, I think, 11. 11 or 12. 
Qi Have you ever had an occasion to observe the 
relationship between Elroy Tillman, who sits at counsel 
table, and his namesake, young Elroy? 
A. Yes. 
Qi And where and when have you observed that 
relationship? 
A. Ever since Elroy Junior was born. It was a 
good relationship, father-son relationship, 
Qi Would you describe that relationship in 
general terms for the Court and jury? 
A. Well, myself, I thought he spoiled him a little 
bit* you know, too much, but that was Elroy. You know, 
he. really loved Elroy Junior. 
QL Did he express that to you? 
A. Yes, he did and he showed it and everybody 
knew it. Anybody that had, you know. 
know, with Elroy, they knew this. 
MR, BARBER: All right. 
questions on direct examination. 
came in contact, you 
I have no further 
-
33 ! 
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CROSS-EXAMINATiaH 
BY MR, CHRISTENSEN: 
Q. Isn't it more appropriate to say, Mr. Fowler, 
that you went to California with Mr. Tillman on April 23 or 
thereabouts of 19 82 and not March? 
A. Yes, something. Like I say, I don't know. 
Yes. 
0. Did you see Elroy send off a post card to thi$ 
girl "Mickey" or Lori Groneman, as her name has been more 
appropriately called? 
A. No, I did not. 
Q. While you were up here did you ever report an^ 
of these life-threatening instances you have referred to to 
the police? 
A. No, I did not. 
Q. Is your association with Elroy1 s wife 
business-wise at the present? 
A. She's what, sister-in-law, that's about it. 
Q, You work with her, don't you? 
A* No, 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: No further questions. 
THE COURT: Mr. Barber? 
MR* CHRISTENSEN: Oh, excuse me, if I might 
have the Court's indulgence* 
Q. (.By Mr« Christensen) You indicated that he 
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was a f a t h e r 
How many 
20 y e a r s 
*• 
ft 
he was 23 
A. 
f i g u r e t o you w h i l e yow v e r s g r c w i n g u p . 
t i m e s wou ld you e s t i m a t e yoa ss»- El r r ry when h e was 
o l d 
•> 
t h r e e y e a r s , 
ft 
pr io r to 
A. 
Q
" 
A. 
ft 
h e r e . 
A. 
p h o n e , 
o r 21 y e a r s o l d and y c - w e r e 10 T e a r s o l d ? 
I f i g u r e , w h a t , i n y e a r s a r e y rc . t a l k i n g ahou 
How much c o n t a c t d i d TOU r a r e vtzh him a f t e r 
Ohf two o r t h r e e o r ~ i r y e a r s r e t w e e n t i m e . 
s i x y e a r s . 
And how many t i m e s d i d yo~ s e e ^ r . T i l l m a n 
A p r i l 2 3 , 19 82? 
Oh, from a l l . t h a t t i n e . 
You w e r e l i v i n g i n C a l i f s r r - a «, 
Y e s , 
Did he come down t h e r e o r d i d y r a come up 
We would c a l l and t a l i t o zne. m o t h e r o v e r t h 
MR, CHRISTENSEN: I l a v e r e f ^ r r r i e r q u e s t i o n s 
REDIRECT EXAMIIS^TTO:; 
BY MR, BASBER: 
ft Do you know, i n r e s p o n s e t c y c ^ r a n s w e r s t o 
f ? 
Mr. C h r i s t e n s e n ' s q u e s t i o n a b o u t •Mxcker* o r l o r i Groneman, 
do you know " M i c k e ^ ' o r L o r i GroneGar.? 
A. I h a d b r i e f c o n t a c t v l t f e ~yJLcjL=?rn a n d , w e l l . 
35. 
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all I know is what is "Mickey/1 
' Q. Okay, ' 
A, Thatfs all, 
. Q. When did you first meet her? 
A. In California, oh, it must have been about 
in the 19 70 fsf 19 75, 19 76, I think. I am not sure. 
QL Okay, Some time ago? 
• A. Yes. 
Qt Did you have conversations ever with Elroy 
about his relationship with Lori Groneman? 
A. No, 
QL DO you know what their relationship was? 
& Just social, I guess. Like I say, I didn't 
know that much about them. 
Ql All right. Did he ever express any opinion 
about her one way or the other to you during the course o 
conversations or your acquaintance with her, brief as it 
was? 
A. No, not too much." 
£ A l l r i g h t . When you had the conve r sa t i ons 
wi th Elroy i n t h e sp r ing of 19 82 about h i s concerns and 
h i s d i f f i c u l t i e s , s ay , wi th being in Utah, d id 
Miss Groneman's name come up? 
A. "Mickey's11 name? 
Q. Y e s , 
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& Yes, it did. 
Qt And was that name raised by Elroy in his 
conversations? 
K Yes. 
Qt What d i d he s a y a b o u t h e r i n c o n n e c t i o n , 
i f a n y t h i n g , w i t h t h e p r o b l e m s he was h a v i n g h e r e ? 
A. He j u s t f e l t t h a t , you know, he was j u s t 
h a v i n g a bad t i m e , you know, j u s t l i k e , you know, l i k e I 
g u e s s a man and woman would have when t h e y ' r e b r e a k i n g u p , 
you know, b u t f a t h e r coming i n . He t o l d h e r one i n c i d e n t 
about ' w h e r e t h e f a t h e r came t o h i s h o u s e and had p o l i c e 
come o v e r and p i c k up some s t u f f and a l l t h i s h e r e , and 
t h a t ' s a b o u t i t . And, l i k e I s a y , I c o u l d n ' t s e e n o t h i n g 
good o r b a d a b o u t i t , I t ' s j u s t what I know, 
ft Did h e e x p r e s s w h e t h e r h e had an i n t e r e s t i n 
c o n t i n u i n g any k i n d of a r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h h e r ? 
ft* W e l l , I know t h a t fo r s u r e he s a i d he wan ted • 
he j u s t w a n t e d t o g e t away from a l l t h i s mess and come b a c k 
t o C a l i f o r n i a , He h a s s t a t e d t h a t , 
$ Did he s t a t e t h a t i n s p e c i f i c c o n n e c t i o n w i t h 
L o r i Grohemari, h e j u s t e d wan ted t o g e t away from h e r ? 
A. Y e s , 
MR, BARBER: That's all I have. 
MR, CHRISTENSEN: No further questions, your 
Honor. 
37 
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I believe, 
THE 
MR, 
THE 
MR* 
COURT: Mr . Christensen? 
CHRISTENSEN: I have nothing further. 
COURT: 
BARBER: 
your Honor, Mr 
THE COURT: 
You may step down, 
Would you assume 
. Welch has already 
Yes, he has, 
MARK WELCH, 
recalled as a witness by 
previously 
BY MR. 
oath? 
jury? 
sworn
 t 
BARBER; 
ft 
A. 
& 
K 
You 
Yes 
sir. 
the stand. 
beeri sworn. 
the defendant, having been 
was examined and testified 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
-
understand, Mark, you are 
f sir , 
Would you s 
~ 
Mark Welch, 
tate your name once 
as follows: 
still under 
again for the 
ft And for purposed of review i f no th ing e l s e , 
I w i l l ask Counsel and t h e C o u r t ' s indulgence fo r b r i e f 
l e a d i n g . 
During the p e r i o d , the beginning of 19 82, 
were you the rocxmmate of Elroy Tillman a t the Garden 
Apartments in Bount i fu l? 
3 
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A. Yes, 
ft And during the course of your association 
with him, ..did you have the occasion to become personally 
acquainted with his habits and have some opportunities to 
observe his character traits and his manner of conducting 
his life? 
A. Yes , I did. 
Qi During that period, Mr. Welch, do you view 
your association with him as having been a positive and goocji 
influence in your life or the contrary? 
A. Yes , I do. 
ft And would you tell us why it is you express 
that feeling about the relationship with Mr. Tillman? 
S. Elroy is a very positive personality, an 
inspiration to people he is around. Always up, always driving, 
trying to do things better. Very conscientious and a very 
good friend, 
Qt Did you have occasions to solicit his help 
at any time in any respects whatsoever? 
& I did. In fact, he offered help even whether 
I didn't ask. He offered to make some mirrors for a friend 
of minefs car. Did it and made them perfectly and gave 
them to me and didn't want anything for it, 
ft Did you have occasions to observe his 
characteristics or honesty and candor? 
39 
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a. Yes, He never owed me a cent. He wouldn't 
allow me to even buy him dinner or anything else. It was 
very important to him to keep everything above board and 
dead even all the time, 
0. Mr. Welch, did you have the occasion at any 
time to become acquainted with or familiar with Elroy's son| 
Elroy? 
A. .No, I never met Elroy Junior but Elroy did 
talk about him a lot and told me that he wanted to return t<J> 
California and make i t right with his son and be the kind 
of father his son needed. He realized that Elroy needed 
him there and he realized that his son couldn't live here. 
He had tried and was taking a l l the necessary steps to 
return to California and be with his son, 
Q, Did he express why i t was that he felt that 
he had to make i t right with him? 
JL Because he fel t like he had spent a lot of 
time away from him and needed to be there with him and 
realized, I think, in — when Elroy Junior came up and 
stayed with him at the f i rs t of the year, he realized how 
much he needed his son and how much he loved his son and 
how much he wanted to be with him, 
Q. Did you ever have the occasion to meet 
Mr, Rosco Fowler? 
A.. . Who? 
40 
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rela* 
l o t . 
your 
ft 
A. 
ft 
k 
ft 
k 
ft 
t ionship 
A. 
ft 
A. 
ft 
k 
ft 
knowledg 
A. 
ft 
answer, I am 
A. 
Elroy f s brother*. 
Yes, Rusty, 
When did tha t occrur? 
I am not sure when they came up to v i s i t . 
Apri l of 19 82 sound familiar to you? 
Apr i l , r i g h t , . 
Did you have the occasion to observe the 
between the two brothers? 
Yes, I think Rusty r ea l l y respected Elroy a 
Rusty? 
Tha t f s what we cal led him, Rusty, 
Tha t f s his brother? 
Right, 
By the way, did Elroy have a nickname, to 
e? 
N o , 
Okay, What was —• you can proceed with the 
sorry I interrupted you, 
We had a r ea l good time, We went out a 
couple t imes and had some long conve r sa t i ons and I th ink 
Elroy r e a l l y l i k e d be ing wi th h i s b r o t h e r and h i s b r o t h e r 
obvious ly l i k e d be ing wi th him. And i t was a v e r y good 
r e l a t i o n s h i p , 
ft Would you c h a r a c t e r i z e the r e l a t i o n s h i p as 
41 
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supportive? 
A. Extremely, yes. 
Q, Were you aware of why Rusty was here? 
A. Elroy had gotten a little homesick, I think, 
gotten a little sort of missing his family and he called --
he made a phone call and said, "Look, I really need to see 
you," They were up here within 24 hours. They hopped in 
the car and drove up here on one phone call. 
Qt Did you have the occasion at any time to 
observe the relationship between Elroy and any of your 
neighbors in the community? 
A. We did play Softball a few times and Elroy 
was always being the coach. Whenever there was a young kid 
or something around that he felt like he could help or he 
was always — always being the driving force in a game or 
always helping out, always — and always an excellent sport 
Qi Were you aware of his knowledge and 
acquaintance with Ron and Betty Schribner? 
A. Yes? He really — 
(t Could you tell me about that relationship 
and the nature of it and what you observed about it? 
A. He really liked Ron and Betty, He had worked 
with Ron after his recovery from surgery, 
ft How do you mean? 
k He took long walks with him, he had to walk 
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because o f h i s — i t was h e a r t surgery or back surgery or 
something l i k e t h a t , and he needed to take w a l k s and Elroy 
would spend hours w i t h Ron j u s t walk ing and b e i n g a f r i e n d 
and h e l p i n g him o u t i f Ron needed t o l i f t something or 
needed something moved, E lroy would always v o l u n t e e r to 
do i t . Always would be t h e r e for him. 
MR, BARBER: Thank you . I have n o t h i n g 
f u r t h e r . 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. CHRISTENSEN: 
©, You i n d i c a t e d , I b e l i e v e , t o d i r e c t examinat ion 
at the p r i o r h e a r i n g t h a t you were roommates w i t h E lroy forj 
about two w e e k s , w e r e you not? 
A, I t h i n k l i k e three weeks , 
Qt So your opinions were formed during this 
roughly three-week period of time as to what he was like? 
A. Probably a two-month period of time. 
QL How long did you live with him, Mr. Welch? 
K Well, my opinion started before that time I 
lived with him, 
gt Did you ever have any occasion to have him ow^ : 
you money before that time for rent? 
A. Never a cent. 
Q, You weren't sharing rent at that time, were 
43 
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you? 
A. NO, but we did go out to dinner and do 
things together , 
Q, How old did Elroy tell "you he was? 
A. It never came up. 
Q. Did he ever tell you he was on parole? 
ft. Yes. 
QL Did you know anything about his past? 
JL Not to speak of. He told me about "Mickey" 
and/or Lori, and a few sketchy things, 
QL Did you ever see Elroy make a check out or 
provide any support for Elroy Junior? 
A. No. 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: No further questions. 
MR* BARBER: I have nothing further, your 
Honor, 
step down. 
THE COURT: Fine. Thank you, sir. You may 
CRE.OIA FOWLER, 
a witness called by the defendant, having been duly 
sworn, was examined and testified on her oath as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR, BARBER: 
Qi Would you state your name for the Court and 
' - ii 
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j u r y , ma'am? 
A. My name i s Greola Fowler. 
• ft And where do you l i v e ? 
k I l i v e i n Sepulveda, C a l i f o r n i a . 
Qi Sepulveda? 
A. • Y e s . 
ft That's near Los Angeles, is it? 
k Yes. 
ft Miss Fowler, do you know the defendant in 
this case, Mr. Elroy Tillman? 
k Yes, that's my son. " 
ft When was he born? 
A: Well, February 23 — I have it but I can't 
recall it right off now, but it was February. 
Q. How many children do you have, Mrs. Fowler? 
A. Well, I was the mother of eight, 
ft And where was Elroy Born? 
A* He was born in Oklahoma, 
ft And was he among the older of your children? 
A. No^ I have about four older than him, 
ft All right. Are they substantially older or 
are they — 
ft. 
him, 
ft 
Wellf 
Okay, 
they are, yes, 
At some point 
They are older than 
in his life did your 
45 
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family move to Los Angeles? 
A. Yes, I did, in, oh, it was a good while. 
My older people, my mother and them moved way before I did. 
ft Is that right? 
ft. Uh-htih. 
Qt And you came along? 
A. I came along in the late days. 
' Q. Mrs, Tillman, I suppose over the years you 
have had many opportunities to watch Elroy, his development 
and his problems and to evaluate traits of his character; 
is that true? 
A, Yesf I have been the mother and father for 
him all the time, 
Q. Did he have a father living in the home when 
he was young? 
A. No, he never did, 
Q. All sight. Would you describe for the 
Court and jury you?: impressions of the kind of person he 
is? 
A. Well, he is just like mostly any other child 
when you're bringing them up. He didn't give me much 
trouble. See, because he had to work and take care of 
myself, 
Q. Uh-huh, He got in trouble, though, when he 
was younger, didn't he? 
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A. Yes, he did, 
QL • And what was the kind of trouble that he got 
into? • , 
A. Well, the most trouble he would get into he ] 
would always be with someone else and he always taking the 
fall for the other fellow* j 
Q. Did you ever see him perform acts that were » 
i 
violent and designed to cause lasting difficulty for people? 
A. I never did know anything like that. Never I 
j 
did see him do anything violent, It wasn't just little 
fights with children in school and things like that, but 
not no violence, 
Qt Was he the kind of an individual that was 
prone to bearing grudges? 
A. Not as I notice of him, he never did. 
Q. Are you aware of the relationship between 
Elroy and his son, Elroy? 
A, Yes, I know he really loves his son. 
ft And can you tell me anything you know about 
his son's feeling for him? 
A* Well, his son really loves his father. 
QL Has 
family because of 
A. Not 
about that. 
there been pain caused to the boy and his 
Elroyfs period of absence? 
as I notice of, I haven't noted anything 
47 
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Qt All r igh t , Ms. Fowler, do you believe that 
the death penalty i s an appropriate penalty to be inflicted 
on Elroy as a resul t of his conviction in this case? 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: Same objection, your Honor. 
THE COURT: She may answer, 
Qt CBy Mr, Barber) Do you believe tha t ' s what 
should happen to him? 
A* No, I don't believe they should do that , 
Qt - Why? 
A. Because, you know, the Bible says don't take 
lives. It says it's judgment day coming, don't believe 
what man say, think about what Jehovah is going to do. 
He is the one that is going to judge us all, 
Qt Do you believe that if he were permitted to 
live, Elroy would be a threat? 
ft. No, I don't think. 
Qt To society or to people he knew? 
ft. I don' t believe so, 
MR. BARBER: I have nothing further. 
BY MR. 
strong 
CHRISTENSEN 
& 
Bapti 
A. 
Miss 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
> 
Fowler, isn't 
st by religion? 
I am not a Baptist, 
it. true that you re a very 
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ft All right. You have a religious belief? 
A. I am a Jehovah's Witness, 
ft And while your son, Elroy, was growing up, 
did you teach him right from wrong? . " . 
A. Yes, I did, I would send my children, that's 
when I used to be a Baptist, when they were growing up 
because I used to send him to Sunday schools. 
Q. Did you teach him stealing was bad? 
A. No, I would tell him all the time, "Don't 
never take nothing that don't belong to you." 
0. All right. How about injuring other people? 
A. Well, he didn't injure nobody. 
Q, What about killing someone? Did you teach 
him that was wrong? 
A. I don't believe he killed nobody and I don't 
believe he would do it, 
£ But you did teach him those things? 
A. I didn't teach him to do anything wrong. 
Q. Isn't it true that Elroy was born in 19 35? 
A, Yes, 
QL And t h a t would make him about 47 y e a r s o l d , 
would i t not? 
A* Yes. 
QL And t h a t was in Tulsa f Oklahoma? 
A, Tulsa r ' Oklahoma, 
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Qt i s n ' t i t true that when Elroy got to be 
about 21 years of age he got into substantial trouble with 
the law? 
k Yes, he did. He got in some trouble but, 
you know, the thing about i t , he always did, he would get 
in with someone else and he would always come out taking 
the rap hisself when somebody else had done something first 
but he was there and they know he was there and they just 
said he was in with them. 
Q. I believe his f i rs t substantial trouble was 
about 19 52, wasn't it? 
k I guess so, 
Q. And then again in 19 53? 
A. I don't know nothing about '53, 
Q. What about '55? 
A. I just don't know. I didn't keep up with the 
time. 
Qi What about in 19 62? 
A. Yes, I think he got in some trouble there and 
know what 
Qt' 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
i t ' s a l l about. 
And in 1967? 
I don't know anything about that either. 
1977? 
I don't know nothing about a l l them times. 
1978? 
JL 
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 A. I don' t know, I don' t know anything about 
2
 them times, 
3
 J ft • • When did you f i r s t find out about Elroy's 
being charged with th is crime of murder? 
5
 A. Well, I found out. My daughter told me. He 
6
 ca l led his s i s t e r , 
7
 Q. I s n ' t i t tirue that most mothers don't want 
8
 their 'boys to die by whatever means? 
9
 A, Yes, I don ' t want mine to die because I 
10 wouldn't take nobody's l i f e . 
11
 Qi Were you aware that Elroy had a good job here 
12 in Salt Lake during 1982? 
13 & That 's what my daughter said. My daughter 
14 used to l ive here and t h a t ' s what she said, he had a good 
15 job, 
16 ft Had a nice apartment? 
1 7
 A. •. Y e s . 
18
 Qt Had a l l the g i r l friends he needed? 
19
 A. I don' t know anything about his woman friends 
20 ft Did you know he was ready to get off parole 
21 in September of 1982? 
22 ft. Y e s . 
23 Q, , So he had things going pretty well for him 
24 for a change, d idn ' t he? -
25 J & Yesf he had things going pretty well , 
' . • 51 
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Q. Making a good l i v i n g ? 
A. I g u e s s s o . I w a s n ' t h e r e . 
Qt Do you know w h e t h e r o r n o t he p rov ided fo r 
h i s s o n ' s s u p p o r t ? 
k I know h i s son was up h e r e w i t h him a w h i l e . 
0. But do you know i f h e p r o v i d e d for h i s suppor 
when he was n o t w i t h him? 
JL I d o n ' t know, I d o n ' t l i v e w i t h them. 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: No f u r t h e r q u e s t i o n s , 
THE COURT: Mr
 f B a r b e r ? 
MR. BARBER; Y e s . 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. BARBER: 
Q. Mrs , F o w l e r , you knew E l r o y had been i n p r i so^ i 
o f f and on d u r i n g t h e y e a r s , d i d n ' t you? 
A. Y e s , I know t h a t b u t I d o n ' t know t h e y e a r s 
and t h i n g s . 
Qt S u r e . And you d o n ' t ho ld him b l a m e l e s s f o r 
t h a t , d i d you? 
A. No, I d o n ' t h o l d him b l a m e l e s s fo r i t 
b e c a u s e a l o t of i t w a s n ' t h i s f a u l t , 
&. 
A. 
Qt 
But some of it" was, wasn't it? 
Some of it was. 
And in respect with Mr, Christensen's 
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questions about girls, did you give Elroy advice about his 
girl friend? 
A. I gave all my boys advice about their ladies. 
Q. What was that advice? 
A* I say to let them alone, don't be bothered 
with them. If you have a wife, keep your wife and forget 
about these other outside women. 
Q. All right. Were you disappointed that 
sometimes Elroy didn't take that advice? 
A. Yes , he d i d n ' t t a k e i t , 
MR, BARBER: T h a t ' s a l l . 
MR, CHRISTENSEN: I have no th ing f u r t h e r , 
your Honor, 
down. 
THE COURT: Thank y o u , ma'am. You may s tep . 
DORIS TILIMAN, 
a w i t n e s s c a l l e d by the d e f e n d a n t , having f i r s t been du ly 
s w o r n / w a s examined and t e s t i f i e d oh her oath as f o l l o w s : 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR, BARBER: 
Qt Miss Tillman, would you please state your 
name for the jury? 
A* Doris Tillman, 
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Q, Where do you live? 
A. Los Angeles, California, 
Q, Are you married? 
A. Yes ,. 
Q, And t o whom a r e you m a r r i e d ? 
A. E l r o y T i l l m a n , 
Q. Do y o u have any c h i l d r e n ? 
A. Y e s , 
Q, How many? 
A. I h a v e t h r e e b u t one by E l r o y , 
QL And w h a t i s h i s name? 
A. E l r o y T i l l m a n , J r . 
Q. And how o l d i s he? 
A* H e ' s 1 1 , 
ft' Are you ne rvous? 
A. Yes , 
Qi P l e a s e t r y t o r e l a x and I r e c o g n i z e t h e 
d i f f i c u l t y of t h i s . 
Miss T i l l m a n , when d i d you f i r s t meet E l r o y ? 
A. I n 1 9 7 0 , 
ft And w h e r e was t h a t ? 
A. At my g i r l f r i e n d ' s h o u s e . He l i v e d n e x t 
d o o r t o h e r . 
ft I n Los Angeles? 
& Y e s , 
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. Q, And shortly after that meeting did you have 
a romantic relationship with Elroy that ultimately led to 
your marriage? 
& Yes. 
Qi And when did you get married?~ 
A. 1970. 
Qi Was there any period of time that you lived 
together with Elroy? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And what period — what was the first such 
period of time you can recall? 
A. In 19 70, 
£X And how long did that relationship persist? 
A. And 1971, for about a year. 
QL Okay, Now, Doris, when you met Elroy, 
were you aware that he had a criminal record and had just 
been released from prison? 
A. Well, no, 
Q. How long did it take you to discover it? 
A. After we got married, 
Qi Okay. That was a very brief relationship, 
was it? 
A. It was, 
• Q. All right. And did he try to hide that fact 
from you or did he deceive you about it? 
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A. No. 
Qi And did he tell you in some general detail th£ 
nature of his former problems with the law? 
A. ' Not too much, 
Q. Oif d i d you ask? 
A. No, 
Q. Did the fact that in your knowledge he had ha<(l 
problems with the law and in fact been to prison affect 
your judgment about him? 
A* No. 
Qi What is your view of him as a man? 
A. Since I have known him he has been very 
considerate, understanding and honest to me and my son. 
Before all this happened he told my son that all he wanted 
to do was to write and come home with all of us when he 
got off parole. 
Q. Did young Elroy know he was on parole? 
A. Yes, he did because he came out here for 
about six months with his father. 
Qi And was that with your permission? 
A* Yes. 
Q, And d id you have concern about sending your 
young son t o r e s i d e with Elroy? 
A. Yes, I d i d . 
Q. And was your experience in that respect one 
5£ 
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1
 that you were satisfied with? 
2
 A, Yes, 
3
 I & • As far as you could tell, he did what a 
father should in respect to taking care of young Elroy? 
5
 . A. He did everything for him. He loved him more 
6
 than anything, 
7
 0- Now, he has not always been a good supporter, 
8 has he? 
9
 A, No, but he tried his best, I believe. 
10 Q. He has had a period of imprisonment, has he? 
11 JL Yes. 
12 Q. And because of that do you believe he has had 
13 some difficult ies in that respect? 
14 A. Y e s , 
15 ft Do you believe that when he has had the 
16 capacity and the capability of helping you he has been 
17 willing to do it? 
18 A. Yes, he has • 
19 Qt Have you watched the personal relationship 
20 between Elroy and his son? 
21 K Yes, I have, 
22 Q, Would you characterize that relationship 
23 for us? 
24 A. They are very close and they both love one 
25 another and I really believe tha t ' s a l l that really matters 
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1 t o him more t h a n anybody e l s e , 
2 ft Miss Ti l lman, - do you s t i l l l o v e your husband? 
3 A. Y e s , I d o . 
4 ft Even though these difficulties have happened? 
5 & That*s because I understand, 
6 $ And even though he has had these problems 
7 and not always been faithful to you, has he? 
8 A, R i g h t / 
9 ft How d o you r e c o n c i l e t h e f a c t t h a t he h a s n ' t 
10 b e e n a good and f a i t h f u l husband w i t h t h e f a c t t h a t you 
11 s t i l l l o v e him? -
12 A. W e l l , I — w e l l - -
13 ft T h i s i s a t o u g h q u e s t i o n , I know. Do you 
14 b e l i e v e he had u l t i m a t e i n t e n t i o n s t o do r i g h t by you? 
15 & Yes . 
16 ft And w h a t i s t h e b a s i s of t h a t b e l i e f ? 
17 A. B e c a u s e l i k e I s a i d , he j u s t w a n t e d t o b e 
18 w i t h h i s f a m i l y t h a t he l o v e d . He d i d n ' t l o v e anybody o u t 
19 h e r e . 
20 ft Over t h e p e r i o d of y e a r s d i d he come back 
21 r e g u l a r l y and m a i n t a i n h i s c o n t a c t s w i t h ycru? 
22 A« Y e s , he d i d . He was a lways h o n e s t w i t h me 
23 a b o u t wha t he was d o i n g . 
24 ft D o Y o u b e l i e v e he ' s a w o r t h w h i l e human b e i n g ? 
25 A. Y e s , I d o , . 
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MR. BARBER: T h a t ' s a l l , 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. CHRISTENSEN; 
Q. Miss T i l l m a n , you i n d i c a t e d t h a t you met 
Elroy sometime dur ing 19 70; i s t h a t c o r r e c t ? 
A. Y e s . 
Q, How l o n g d i d you c o u r t each o ther b e f o r e you 
g o t married? 
A* Not q u i t e two months , 
QL A l l r i g h t . I s n ' t i t true t h a t Elroy i s a 
p r e t t y smooth t a l k e r when he wants t o be? 
!L Yes, but that wasn't i t , I had become 
pregnant and that's why we really got married. He wasn't 
ready to sett le down so, you know, that's why I l e t him go 
until he was ready, then he could come back to me. 
QL In 19 70 how old did you think Elroy was? 
A. About 35. 
Q, And did you ever talk to him about his 
criminal past? 
A. Not much, no. I believe in letting the past 
stay in the past. 
Q. Did you know what his situation was like in 
1982? 
A. Yes, 
59 
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& Did you know he had a good job? 
A, Yes, t did. 
Q. Did you know he was a l s o apparen t ly in love 
w i th Lori Groneman? 
K . t d o n ' t b e l i e v e t h a t . I know he was wi th 
h e x , b u t I d o n ' t b e l i e v e he loved heir. 
Q. What about Car l a Sagers? 
A. I d i d n ' t know any th ing about h e r . 
& You were aware f were you n o t , t h a t i n 19 82 he 
was on p a r o l e ? 
A* Right , 
Q, You i n d i c a t e d t h a t he provided some support 
t o you throughout t h e t imes t h a t he cou ld . What about i n 
138-2? Did h a g ive you any s u p p o r t payments ox o-thex types 
of alimony oi t h i n g s of t h a t n a t u r e ? 
A, No, he d i d n ' t , All he d id was buy my son a 
l o t of t h i n g s t h a t he needed, 
Qt Wel l , what about you? 
A. I d i d n ' t want him t o do anything for me, 
Q. But you were s t i l l mar r ied to him, w e r e n ' t 
you? 
A. Yes
 t But I know he was having i t ha rd , you 
know, and I unders tand 1 am t o o , b u t I b e l i e v e he did the 
b e s t he cou ld , 
Qt, Didl you know of. any o the r wives he was 
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m a r r i e d t o ? 
A* No, 
ft At t h e same t ime he was m a r r i e d t o you? 
A. No. 
0- Did you know that for a time Lori Groneman 
posed as his common law wife? 
A. I know they were together a long time, 
. Qt Is Elroy smart? 
A. Is he smart? Yes, I think so, 
Qt Knows right from wrong? 
A, Yes. 
ft Knows t h a t k i l l i n g i s wrong? 
A. Yes , 
ft Or d o i n g harm t o someone i s wrong? 
A. Yes . 
Qt Or s t e a l i n g ? 
A. Yes, 
Q. Or r o b b i n g someone? 
A. Yes. 
ft Or u s i n g d rugs o r s m u g g l i n g d r u g s ? 
JL Y e s , 
ft No q u e s t i o n i n y o u r mind he knew r i g h t from 
wrong i n t h e s e c i r c u m s t a n c e s ? 
A- R i g h t , 
ft And h e was g i v e n q u i t e a few c h a n c e s , w a s n ' t 
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h e , t o p r o v e h i m s e l f b o t h by t h e law and by you? 
k Yes , h e w a s , 
0- And in your estimation do you think that he 
heeded those chances or those advantages that were given 
to him? 
A. No. 
Q, And y e t h e had r e a l l y a l o t g o i n g f o r h im, 
d i d n ' t he? 
> Yes , h e d i d , 
gi Good looks, smooth talking, able to 
communicate? 
A. Yes, 
Qi And t o w a r d s t h e end he had a good j o b and a 
hope f o r t h e f u t u r e ? 
A. R i g h t , 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: No f u r t h e r q u e s t i o n s , 
THE COURT: Mr. Ba rbe r? 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR, BARBER: 
Qt With a l l t h a t go ing for him, how d o you suppose 
t h i s b u s i n e s s h a p p e n e d ? I w i l l w i thd raw t h a t q u e s t i o n , 
y o u r Honor , 
D o r i s , do you have a job? 
A. Yes
 f I d o , 
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ft 
A. 
ft 
A. 
ft 
A. 
ft 
A. 
your Honor, 
down. 
your Honor. 
Are you a b l e to support y o u r s e l f ? 
Yes , 
You nave done it forever, haven't you?. 
All my life. 
What do you do for a l i v i n g ? 
I am a n u r s e . 
That is your income meets your needs? 
Yes. 
MR. BARBER: I have nothing further. 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: I have nothing further, 
THE COURT: Thank you, ma'am. You may step 
MR. BARBER: Defense rests, your Honor. 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: The State has no rebuttal, 
THE COURT: We have a matter on those exhibits! 
do we not? 
MR, BARBER; Pardon? 
THE COURT: We have the matter on t h o s e 
e x h i b i t s of t h e S t a t e , 
MR, CHRISTENSEN: T h a t ' s c o r r e c t . 
MR, BARBER: Yes , -
THE COURT: Wel l , l e t ' s excuse — how long do 
you imagine you are g o i n g to take oh t h a t , gent lemen? 
63 
1924 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
MR, BARBER: Oil t h e e x h i b i t ques t ion? 
THE COURT: Yes, 
MR, BARBER: Oh, ten minutes , 
THE COURT: Al l r i g h t , - I am going t o excuse 
the jury for about t en m i n u t e s , again with my admonition 
to speak to no one, l e t no one speak t o you and t h e 
ju ry may be excused for ten minutes and wai t o u t s i d e . 
IWhereupon, t h e ju ry l e f t the courtroom.] 
THE COURT: I have in f ron t of me E x h i b i t s 1 
through 7 i n c l u s i v e , 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: Including 8, your Honor, 
which i s the ---
THE COURT: Pardon? 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: Including 8, which i s t h e 
f i n g e r p r i n t comparison on each of the c o n v i c t i o n s . 
MRV BARBER: Your Honor, I have as y e t n o t 
seen any of those e x h i b i t s , . Might I approach the bench? 
THE COURT: Would you p re fe r t o see them in? 
They appear t o be c e r t i f i e d exemplif ied copies of documents 
of o ther c o u r t s , Not having seen the same, do you want 
a few minutes t o look a t them? Where i s No, 8, Mr, Shewell} 
MR:, CHRISTENSEN';. The black diagram, your 
Honor. 
THE CLERK: I t ' s r i g h t h e r e , 
THE COURT: Oh, y e s . 
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1 I MR, BARBER: Your Honor, in respect to 
2 Exhibit No, 6, there is a great deal of surplus with that, 
3
 I believe i t appropriate under the laws of the State of 
4
 Utah that the conviction i tself , which is contained within 
5 this exhibit be submitted, but we also have the indictment, 
.6 which is merely a statement of the characters which is 
7 improper, We have minutes of the United States District 
8 Court for the District of California, they are improper. 
9 We then have the commitment, which I think is fine and have 
10 no objection to other than on the basis of hearsay, as I 
11 have indicated before, Then what we have got here is a 
12 business about his probation and an order to show cause 
13 alleging, a violation —- • • 
14 T H E COURT: Was there any finding of 
15 violation? . 
16 MR, CHRISTENSEN: There was and he was 
17 committed pursuant to that and that is part of the record 
18 a,s w e l l , 
19 MR, BARBER: Except it isn't a felony, 
20 ., MR, CHRISTENSEN: It's a felony, 
21 MR, BARBER: It's a violation. All kinds 
22 of charges in here that are irrelevant. Another 
23 jnodified petition that recites the same stuff, and then we 
24 have a judgment and commitment about which I have no 
25 I objection other than those heretofore stated. 
65 
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MR. CHRISTENSEN: Your Honor, to obviate the 
need for the records per se themselves going in, the reason 
for State's No, 9, it outlines the convictions respecting 
that and the fingerprint that corresponds with that and the | 
date of that conviction. 
MR. BARBER: I don't have any problem with 
this one. If you want to pull 1 through 7, I will 
stipulate to 8, 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: What I would pose, your 
Honor, is the Court instruct the jury with regard to the 
convictions that they substantiate and are corroborated by 
State's Exhibit 8 and we would offer State's Exhibit 8 
into evidence in lieu of those and avoid any extraneous 
hearsay problems. 
MR, BARBER: I have no problem with that at 
all, your Honor, 
THE COURT: You say you will receive 8 as 
what? 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: That will be -- basically 
a summary of the coiivictions, your Honor, as indicated by 
State's Exhibits 1 through 6 or 7^  and I believe that in and 
of itself would not be prejudicial in terms of objections 
that Mr* Barber is indicating by the other official documents 
that are before the Court. 
MR, BARBER: We certainly view that as the 
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better alternative, your Honor, There is just too much 
raspberries in these other exhibits. 
THE COURT: What do you propose now, in what 
respect? 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: For the court's record, 
your Honor, we would offer State's Exhibits 1 through 7 
inclusive, which are the judgments and convictions of the 
court. 
THE COURT: Judgments and convictions? 
MR, CHRISTENSEN: We would ask those be made 
a record of the court. 
THE COURT: Record of the court? 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: Of the court, but not be 
viewed by the jury. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR, BARBER: I have no objection to that. 
MR* CHRISTENSEN: We would ask, however, that 
for purposes of the jury's deliberations the State's 
Exhibit 8 which is a summary in visual form, which 
encompasses those othe£ convictions and the dates of those 
convictions, "be allowed to be viewed by the jury and argued 
to the jury and taken to 
deliberations, 
THE 
MR, 
COURT: 
BARBER 
the 
Is 
jury 
that 
room 
your 
with 
; My understanding 
them 
is 
for 
that what 
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I will do is not stipulate to the technical or not object 
to the technical aspects of it and simply call the attentioji 
of the Court that we have filed a motion to the effect that 
we are not relying oh lack of record as a mitigating 
factor and, therefore, think it inappropriate to 
introduce the record of convictions as an aggravating facto£ 
THE COURT: Exhibits 1 through 7 will be 
received with the court but not for the jury. It's 
merely for a review or a recapitulation, 
MR, CHRISTENSEN: That's correct, 
THE COURT: Of what the matters are. Is that 
the understanding? 
MR. BARBER: Thatfs my understanding, your 
Honor, and subject to the other objection, I don't object. 
THE COURT: I understand. All right. It may 
be received and will be used &s indicated, 1 through 7 will 
not go to the jury and No* 8 may be used for argument 
purposes* 
MR. BARBER: Indeed. Very good. 
THE COURT: Any other evidence then that you 
have, gentlemen? 
MR, CHRISTENSEN: State has none, your Honor, 
MR, BARBER: And the defense has none, 
THE COURT: I have not prepared the written 
instructions yet, and I should meet with you gentlemen — 
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MR. BARBER: Indeed, 
THE COURT:'—on those. What are your 
suggestions as to that? I presume I can do the same within| 
the hour. How long do you intend to argue, gentlemen? 
MR. BARBER: Your Honor, I anticipate the 
defense argument on the penalty will probably be about one 
hour, 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: I would ask for a 
commensurate amount of time, your Honor, I would also ask 
the Court to split mine into a rebuttal as well as a closing 
in chief and — 
THE COURT: I will discuss that. I have 
some problems — of course, the State has the burden. 
MR, CHRISTENSEN: We do, your Honor, and that| 
burden has changed substantially since the instances 
Mr, Barber talked about and in more recent cases the State 
has been allowed to close and the Rules of Evidence and 
Procedure both provide, 
THE COURT: Where — in what case has the Sta^e 
been allowed? 
MR, CHRISTENSEN: The Moore case, your Honor, 
the 
Sup: 
most 
reme 
recent case. 
THE 
Court, 
MR, 
COURT: The 
CHRISTENSEN: 
Moore 
: We 
case 
had — 
did 
- we 
not 
11 -
go to the 
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THE COURT: What case of the Supreme Court 
ruled on? 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: The last case, your Honor. 
They ruled oh with respect to proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt was the Wood case and there has been nothing to — 
THE COURT: There was nothing to do with this 
matter. That wasn't a point brought on appeal at all. 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: But that's correct -- but 
the issue was proof Beyond a reasonable doubt and when the 
State has that standard and burden, the rules provide that 
they have both the right and the responsibility to open 
and close the case when there is that burden. 
MR, BARBER: That burden hasn't changed at 
all, your Honor, it's just the courts have recognized 
what the burden is and clarified it. But that being 
equal — 
THE COURT: I feel the burden did change. 
MR, BARBER: Indeed. And I am well aware of 
why the Court says that. Perhaps we could discuss the 
matter in chambers and come to some solution. 
THE COURT: What I am trying to think on 
behalf of the jury, if I have to have the —• these 
instructions retyped by the downstairs people, we're 
talking about -- I think we better let the jury go until 
1:QQ, don't you? 
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MR. BARBER: I would view that as the ideal. 
THE COURT: Because if you want to argue an 
hour, I presume two hours, a half hour for instructions, 
then we're going to be breaking right in the middle. 
Let's bring the jury back and I will excuse them. 
[Whereupon, the jury returned to the 
courtroom,] 
THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, 
I have reviewed the matters with counsel on the matters, 
but we have reached our conclusions and decisions on those 
matters. And the next matter is the matter of again 
instructing the jury, and as I have indicated before, I 
have had two proposals from each side. I have to meet with 
them, determine what instructions will be prepared in 
writing and then counsel will want to argue. 
They have indicated their time to argue and 
we will not be able to prepare the written instructions 
and do the argument prior to the noon hour. Consequently, 
I am going to excuse the jury until 1:30 p.m. and at which 
tiine the case will be argued to you by counsel and I will 
instruct yon in writing oh the law that is applicable. 
And I will admonish, you again on this recess, speak to no 
one, let no one speak to you and don't make up your minds 
until you have heard the Court's instructions on the law as 
it applies to this phase and counsels' argument. 
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The jury then may be excused until 1:30 p.m. 
I will meet counsel in chambers/ 
{Noon recess.] ' 
MR. BARBER: Your Honor, prior to proceeding 
with instructions, if the Court will recall, we did have 
leave to open to make two motions to admit items, the 
motions have been made in writing and — 
THE COURT: Yes. They may be received and 
your motions to have them received. 
MR, BARBER: And of course to have them given 
to the jury. As the Court recalls, I think it was agreed 
they would be admitted, but the Court has already ruled but 
I don't recall that was on the record. 
THE COURT: Yes. It's now on the record. 
They will be received and not given to the jury. 
MR, BARBER: And might, your Honor, we just 
have clarification of that after the instructions and the 
arguments or whatever? -
THE COURT; Yes, you may have the courtesy of 
the record. 
MR, BARBER: Thank you very much, 
THE COURT: The record may show all the jurors) 
are present. 
It is now my duty, ladies and gentlemen, to 
read to you the additional instructions as they relate to 
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this phase of the case. As before, these have been 
prepared in writing and I will read the same to you and 
they will go with you to the jury room. 
[Whereupon, the Court read the instructions 
to the jury,] 
THE COURT: Now, we'll now have the 
opportunity to argue the case. The State of Utah, with the 
burden, will have the opportunity to make the opening 
argument. You may proceed, Mr. Chrlstensen, 
MR, CHRISTENSEN: Thank you, your Honor. 
If it please the Court, Mr, Barber, 
Mr, Verhoef, co-counsel and ladies and gentlemen of the 
jury: As we have indicated to you throughout the trial, 
the position of the State has been that of first degree 
murder and commensurate with first degree murder, the 
State now argues to you the imposition of death with respecij 
to this particular individual. 
Throughout the trial and throughout these 
proceedings, I feel it has become abundantly clear that 
several themes seem to persist in the life of 
Mr* Elroy Tillman, Several themes that were enunciated 
by various of the victims, various of the State's witnesses 
who have been called to testify during these proceedings 
the last few weeks of this trial. 
And I believe those particular themes have 
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been borinsout by the defense witnesses who have been called 
here to testify or to argue or to raise doubt as to the 
appropriateness of the death sentence itself. 
You recall my closing argument last week, we 
talked about the question and the statement that Mr, Tillmaiji 
made to Lori Groneman in the fact that, "You don't know 
who you1 re dealing with.." 
You recall further statements that he made in 
that no matter what happened to him if he went to jail or 
otherwise, he would get back at her and he never forgot? 
In the course of these proceedings here in the penalty phasd 
various documents have been introduced to you to substantiate 
the State's position and why it is requesting the sentence 
of death in this particular case. 
State's Exhibit 8 which has been introduced 
and which you will have a chance to take with you 
capsulizes Mr, Tillman's conduct over the past 20 or so 
years beginning in 1953 and ending with his conviction in 
19 82 for first degree murder of Mark Schoenfeld, And you 
will see a pattern of conduct. You will see attempted 
burglary, grand larceny, grand larceny after conviction for 
3 felonyf attempted robbery after three prior convictions. 
He is capable from a penal institution. 
Possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, probatiorl 
violations, felon with a guri and, of course, the culmination 
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in the criminal homicide of Mr. Schoenfeld. 
In summary of the judge's instructions to you 
you are basically asked by the Court and based upon your ow:(i 
moral/ philosophical, religious, common sensical approaches 
to everyday life, to make a risk assessment of Mr. Tillman 
in terms of his future life. 
And there are two aspects you must look at in 
making that risk assessment. Aggravating circumstances, 
which include and incorporate — the way the killing was 
initiated against Mr, Schoenfeld, the intentional knowing 
senseless killing of him. prior felony convictions and 
backgroundf his willingness to change even after breaks hav^ : 
been given to him, and future rehabilitation of Mr, Tillman 
himself. 
During the course of the guilt phase Mr. Barber-
made basically a pitch to you in the form of placing the 
blaiUQ on Car la Sagers
 T Apparently from your verdict you 
found that wasn't true and found by proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt that Mr. Tillman was the culprit in this case and 
that he killed Mark Schoenfeld, You may have asked yourself, 
"Well, if we execute or find the sentence of death against 
M;r, Tillman, shouldnft we also find one against 
Csrla Sagers?" 
And you recall the State granted her immunity 
And I think if you read the instructions which talks about 
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mitigating circumstances of an individual in terms of their 
involvement with the crime, you can see why immunity was 
granted and why, as in this case, the culprit still 
remains Mr. Elroy Tillman. 
It talks in there as to whether or hot the 
defendant has significant history of prior criminal activity 
and you recall Carla's testimony, she has never even been 
arrested before, Whether the murder was committed while th^ 
defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or 
emotional disturbance. And none has been shown and none 
has been proven with regard to Mr. Tillman. 
In fact, just the opposite. He has no 
addictionsf he wasn't suffering from intoxication or other 
types of insanity-types of defenses during this crime. He 
is a bright gentleman. He did know right from wrong, as his 
kind mother so ably put, and his wife and his brother and 
it's kind of a sad thing. We all have wives or most 
of us have wives or mothers or someone who cares about us 
and is willing to forgive us, I suppose, no matter what 
the situation may be. But you are in a different situation 
as jurors because as we talk to you about in the penalty 
phase or guilt phase of this trial, you have to weigh the 
scales of justice. You stand between law and order and 
chaos. 
You must look out for the rights of the State 
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1 and the people and your peers that comprise it as well as 
2 those rights of Mr* Tillman, and you have been able to say 
3 what is characterized as a sifting process. Not every 
4 intentional and knowing killing warrants the death penalty 
5 and we talked about it and you saw a lesser included 
6 instruction in the penalty phase of second degree murder. 
7 And there is a sifting process that goes on once a conviction 
8 for first degree murder is had and, again, aggravating and 
9 mitigating circumstances are put forward and a sifting 
TO process goes on once more. And these are all constitutional 
11 rights that Mt. Tillman exercises and enjoys, 
12 And that sifting process comes to a head 
13. when you go out to deliberate, but at the same time you sti] 
14 have the obligations of the State and Mr, Tillman to weigh 
15 and balance and future risks that may be posed by 
16 Mr. Tillman's future conduct. Bear this in mind. There 
17 is-a presumption of innocence in the guilt phase, but there| 
18 is no presumption whatsoever of life over execution in a 
19 capital murder case, 
20 So we stand equal at this point in time with 
21 I Mr. Tillman in balancing out and assessing those risks that| 
22 | you must take with you to the jury room. And after I 
23 | conclude my remarks with you, you yourselves have to live 
24 | with your decision. No one else. Now, we know a lot about| 
25 | Mr. Tillman and I think, as you view this record — and I 
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might indicate a r a their extensive record involving a lot of 
different types of crimes — you can ask yourselves 
several things in assessing the risk of Mr. Tillman. 
You know what he did while he was on the 
streets from between 19 53 and 19 82. KB committed severj 
felonies* Now, those are convictions in all probability 
just before jurors like yourself in a sifting process. 
You know what he has done while he has been in prison 
by virtue of the escape that occurred in 1964. You know 
what he does on probation and parole. You see that in 19 79 
with a probation violation, felon with a gun, and you know 
from testimony of both Lori Groneman and Carla Sagers what 
he was doing while he was on parole from August of 19 80 
through the murder on May 26 of 19 82, 
He was conspiring, he was plotting, he was 
having others buy firearms for him so he wouldn't run the 
risk of a parole violation. He was experimenting in bombs, 
he was making harrassing phone calls through third parties 
and I think if you look at that and consider Carla Sagers, 
who interestingly enough sort of reminded me a little bit off 
Mr, Tillman's wife, led along, led to believe one thing whe4 
in fact another was occurring. And I think you look at 
Carla Sagers and the devastation that has occurred to her 
life and you say to yourself, "There is a lot of victims 
in this case," Not just Mark Allen Schoenfeld but I think 
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Carla Sagers' testimony begins to ring true to you and you 
begin to see what really was going on during that time 
and why she did the things that she did because that man 
seated across the room, Mr. Elrdy Tillman, who has been 
given break after break after break seven times he has been 
given breaks, conspired to kill for no reason whatsoever 
Mark Allen Schoenfeld, a completely innocent victim. 
Now, you can turn your cheek once and twice 
and even seven times, but that's not going to bring back 
Mark Allen Schoenfeld and you have to ask yourselves, "Do 
I want to run that risk again? Do I dare run that risk 
again?" Because there is no redemption in a risk that 
repeats itself in the type of murder and the type of homicide 
committed by Mr, Tillman against Mr. Schoenfeld, 
And you have to remember that when you go 
to deliberatef 
Now, Mr. Barber is going to want to argue and 
say he deserves another chance or we're going to blame it'oiji 
somebody else, as was done in; the penalty phase or guilt 
phase of" this trial, but at some point in time the buck has 
got to stop. W6 can't shuffle, it around any more. We have 
a man lying dead in his grave and someone is to blame for 
that. And we know who is to blame for it and it's time that 
the buck stops being shuffled about and that the person 
responsible for that is dealt with legally and, as the 
79 . 
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legislature of this state and most other states in the 
union have said, that under the appropriate circumstances 
within the aggravating circumstances by proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt outweigh those of the mitigating 
circumstances and you find by proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt the death penalty is appropriate in the situation, 
you are duty bound to find that sentence and the judge is 
duty bound to order that sentence be carried out. 
It places a burden upon you, a heavy burden, 
but you are not the only jurors to sit in this situation 
nor will you in the future. And we have to say to ourselve^, 
"What is the purpose of the death penalty? Do I deter 
others from that crime?" 
You have to go back and delve into your own 
moral structure and say to yourselves, "What is it that 
stops me from committing crimes? Is it the fear of being 
caught or because my moral beliefs and my conscience says 
that I can't?" 
Fear of being executed or all the rest and 
deterrence comes in to pl£y a little bit. And I say a 
little bit because I am not concerned about what others are 
going to think about your decision todayt Others may want 
to murder somebody. They may give it a second thought and 
if they give it a second thought and it saves a life, then 
that's the reason for deterrents. 
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1
 But more importantly, we are talking about. 
2
 deterrence of one man, one man alone, and that's 
3
 Elroy Tillman who we are going to say, "If we execute this 
man we no longer run the risk associated with what he has 
5
 done in the past and more specifically what he did to 
6
 Mark Allen Schoenfeld when he bludgeoned him to death with 
7
 an ax and then to further disfigure him, set fire to him 
8
 while he was still breathing." 
9
 For no other reason than spite and hatred. 
10
 You have been shown what I guess you could characterize 
11 as mitigating circumstances or circumstances that would 
12 make less severe Mr. Tillman's conduct. But if you look at 
13 the wife and if you look at his mother and his brother, 
14
 did they really say anything to you that you can say to 
15 yourselves they have mitigated the aggravating circumstance^ 
16 or all the bad that Mr. Tillman has done? 
17 I And it's really kind of a sad thing. We listen 
to what the defendant's mitigating circumstances are and 
there is really not a whole lot of to-do or celebration or 
20
 all the rest about the other side of the coin. And the 
21 victim and the parents and the sadness and Carla Sagers and 
22 Lori Groneman and, really, the victims themselves in the 
23 form of Mr. Tillman's wife and his mother because they are 
24 victims also. 
Now, you might say to yourself, "Elroy deserves 
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another chance." Many of you probably between January and 
May of 19 82 were not in as good as circumstances as 
Mr. Tillman, Here he is. Two months shy of parole. He 
has all the girls he can handle, he has a good job and as 
one of the people from Bennett's Glass stated, he was 
making a good living and he could advance. He had an 
apartment full of furniture, according to Mark Welch. He 
had a decent apartment. He had everything going for him, 
You can't say this is a poor dejected person 
who had no breaks. He has had seven breaks and if you want 
to add the eighth, he had a whole series of good breaks 
going for him on May 26 of 19 82, But nobody can force 
anybody to accept or acknowledge breaks. They have to 
decide in their own mind how moral they want to be, how 
law abiding they want to be, how honest with themselves 
they want to be, and that's really what this is all about is 
honesty with oneself. 
You may want to place blame on yourselves 
for being unfortunate enough to have to sit on a death 
jury, but don't put yourself in an^ kind of blame. The 
person who is responsible for your sitting here is 
Elroy Tillman and he has been given breaks time and again. 
So don'te feel guilt or blame yourselves or blame the system 
oi? otherwise. There is one person to blame and whether he 
recognizes it or not, he is the sole person to blame. No 
8 2 
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one held a guh to his head, no one threatened to kill him 
if he didn't kill Mark Allen Schoenfeld, and Car la Sagers 
even , told him she would pay his way to get out of the 
state to get away from the situation. And his brothers 
would have probably driven him back from the situation if 
he wanted. And yet he wouldn't do that because of hatred 
and all the other things that were running through his 
mind when he killed Mark Allen Schoenfeld, 
As I indicated to you in the guilt phase of 
this hearing, you have a responsibility as jurors to balanc^ : 
and weigh and to truthfully and candidly deliberate. You 
cannot do that out of fear or sympathy or capriciousness 
or throwing up of your hands attitude saying this is too 
heavy of a decision for me to make. If you ar'e cowards and 
you must say to yourselves, "The law has no meaning and 
we can randomly go about intentionally, knowingly killing 
people, and that is the signal that you will portray 
unless you find the appropriate sentence in this case and 
can live with it within your conscience knowing the risks 
associated with it, knowing the behavior and temperaments 
of Mr, Tillman, and your own common sense and experience 
and your past experience in this particular case. 
Now* I will have a chance to talk to you in 
brief rebuttal if I choose to do so, Mr. Barber has a 
chance now to discuss with you the aspects of the sentence 
83; 
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as he deems fit, and then you will have a chance to 
deliberate and you may say to yourselves, "Well, it's easy 
for Mr, Christensen to say/1 but as he indicated to you in 
the first phase, yoil probably watched a man age, a 
36-year-old man, in fact, I probably can't pass myself off 
as 36 like Elroy has done, but if I have conveyed to you 
any meaning other than the most serious and solemn of 
duties to present to you in this case, I apologize for that 
because it's a serious and solemn duty and I wouldn't be 
asking you for'the penalty of death under any other 
circumstances or conditions than serious and solemn 
responsibilities and duties. 
Corroborated with the facts, the background 
and the completely senserless intentional and knowing killing 
that was conducted. We thank you in advance for your 
attention in this matter and I can rest assured, and I know 
you believe in your hearts this will probably be the most 
important thing that you will remember for a good long time 
to come, and may you be able to live with that verdict and 
be able to say to yourselves, "That was the appropriate 
verdict under the circumstances and I can rest assured for 
the future safety of society," 
Thank you in advance for your attention. 
THE COURT: Mr, Barber? 
MR, BARBER: Ladies and gentlemen, I am not 
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36 years old any more, I am 41 and perhaps that five years 
has served some purpose in having demonstrated to me that 
I am not quite as smart at 41 as I was at 36 and I think 
perhaps with those added few years9 nature can develop 
individuals and some of you are as old or older than I am, 
but I think that with age comes a maturity that gives us a 
deeper understanding of the nature of life and the nature 
of the situations that we face in life that have been 
manifested by Mr* Christensen in his remarks to you. 
In several senses, ladies and gentlemen, 
I believe his words ring hollow, I believe that — and as 
is obvious to you, the gist of his argument is made of 
these prints of fingerprints beneath which in each instance 
of representing a conviction we have got two words. We hav^ 
on the first one attempted burglary. That implies a 
failure. In 19 54 a grand larceny. Under our law that 
probably is a theft involving more than three or four hundred 
dollars. We have another grand larceny in one year later. 
An attempted robbery*another failure. An escape. Well, 
that imposes all kinds of visions in your mind and we'll 
talk about what that can really mean. 
Possession of marijuana, I will let that one 
speak for itself. Probation violation/ a gun in the house 
and* then, of course, the matter about which we address 
ourselves here. 
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But this little eight or ten or twenty-word 
scenario, ladies and gentlemen, is not an appropriate way 
to sum up a man's life. And in substantial measure, the 
figures on that chart do not represent the life of a man, 
they represent the life of a boy. For if you will recall 
the evidence, Mr, Tillman was. born in 19 35, three of seven 
bad things on that chart, ladies and gentlemen, occurred 
before he was 20. Got afoul of the system in '53 when he 
was 18 with an attempt, not a successful offense. 
Then he steals something a year later, steals 
something a year after that. And he has problems now 
because it's an aggravated kind of grand larceny because 
he has prior convictions for failing. 
An attempted robbery follows that in 1962.. 
Well, even at that time he is what, 26 OE 27 years old? 
Two years later he walks away from Chino Prison or some 
place, and then he has a period in his mature years when he 
is free of difficulty for almost 13 years, . 
Now, *ixr. Christensen talks to you in the 
context of this record and about breaks* When you get 
thi& exhibit into the jury room, I want you to look 
carefully at it. See if there is anything oh there about 
breaks, And I put it to you respectfully, there is not 
anything oh there about breaks. The fact is, which hasn't 
beeii told, is the number of years that Elroy Tillman spent 
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1 in prison as a result of charges you have before you. It's 
2 unfair and it's untrue to speak of that record as reflecting 
3 a series of breaks* 
* Tillmaii paid for those offenses and you have 
5 evidence from his family that he spent long periods of time 
6 incarcerated and away from them. But, ladies and gentlemenI 
i 
7 the final and perhaps the most telling thing about this I 
- i 
8 chart and the argument that Mr. Christensen has made to you 
9 is simply this: Whatever Elroy Tillman is, he is the 
10 direct product of the system of justice which 
11 Mr. Christensen now has the arrogance to suggest justifies 
12 the imposition of the penalty of death* 
13 The system he now says demands that you kill 
14 Elroy Tillman is the very system that made him what he is. 
15 I don't believe that the system is worthy of that kind of 
16 confidence and I will talk more about that to you later. 
17 Bui I think it's important that we not 
18 misapprehend what" is meant by this record. It does not 
19 represent breaks, it represents a life of pain and toil, 
20 incarceration, and grief. And that he has not succeeded 
21 iii escaping that system for the entire duration of his 
22 mature life is not necessarily a credit to that system nor 
23 to anything else that Mr. Christensen has suggested to you, 
2:4 Now, ladies and gentlemen, i .feel awesome 
25 burden in speaking to you about a subject of this magnitude 1 
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There is nothing that has qualified me to ass time this 
responsibility, but I am not sure there is anything that 
can qualify anybody to do it* But I don't shrug from it 
because it's a substantial comfort to me to share that I 
burden with you because I have seen the quality of your 
attention to the evidence in this case, \ 
In all candor, we had reports of the vigor 
with which you debated the issue of guilt. We know that yon 
accorded the defendant the reasonable doubt to which he is 
entitled under the law and we know that notwithstanding 
that you were persuaded that he was guilty, 
I cannot tell you honestly that I necessarily 
agree with your verdict but I do tell you that neither me 
nor Elroy Tillman find criticism of it; We believe that 
you were a fair jury and that you did what you were 
instructed to do and you did it to the best of your ability; 
» 
and we appareciate it; ! 
Now, the Court- has once again instructed you, 
ladies and gentlemen, and it is important to not pass the 
substance of the instruction that requires what you must 
find. For it says the law, ndw aside from the issue of 
guilt, requires that you make two determinations, not 
simply one. First, it must have been proven to you 
beyond a reasonable doubt --* and I think by now you have a 
very firm understanding of the meaning of that phrase — 
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1 But it must be proven by that burden that the aggravating 
2 factors about this offense and Mr. Tillman himself, I 
3 suppose, outweigh the mitigating factors, 
4
 That is that you're convinced beyond a 
5 reasonable doubt, perview of any rational question that he 
6 is such a bad, worthless person and that his crime is so 
7 heinous and he himself is so utterly without worth or 
8 benefit that it's appropriate that he be killed and, 
9 secondly you must conclude also beyond a resonable doubt 
10 that death is the only appropriate and just penalty in lighjt 
11 I of all the circumstances, including those about which we 
12 have just spoken, that he is a product of this system. 
13 That's indeed a heavy burden, ladies and 
14 gentlemen, and we are concerned that you not pass it . j 
I a 
15 lightly, that you not misunderstand its impact and its j 
i 
16 import and that you give the instructions of the Court very; 
i 
17 very careful analysis as you get in the jury room, \ 
I ' *' 
18 Now, Mike has referred to you some talk, about j 
19 the jusitifcation for the death penalty and I suppose in 
20 the ordinary course of things it ought to be my obligation 
21 I to call .attention to the real nature of the difficulty thatj 
f 
22 I has faced us over the last 20 years about the death penalty 
23 | Mike is correct. One of the leading 
24 | justifications for the imposition of this most horrible 
25 | penalty is the proposition and argument that to execute, to 
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kill convicted persons has a deterrent effect upon others. 
And, of course, you have all read, I suppose, the magazines 
and the papers and heard the arguments in your social and 
business circles about it, but the fact is, ladies and 
gentlemen, there is no evidence to support the contention 
that capital punishment is a deterrent. It's true that 
over the last ten or fifteen years we have had a 
tremendous increase in the rate of violent crime and, of 
course, it is that to which the death penalty is addressed. 
But the social scientists and demographers 
who have studied that issue, ladies and gentlemen, have 
generally concluded with tremendous overwhelming support 
that the rise in crime is not related to the quality of 
the penalties we impose. 
When we convict somebody of an offense, the 
factors that have led to the increase in crime appear to be 
(economic factors. They appear to be very much related to 
the fact that crime is typically committed between the 
ages of 17 and 35 and that over the last ten or fifteen 
years the baby boom population surge has reached the age 
where it is likely to see them committing crime in all 
offenses. 
And we are; now having that reflected in the 
crime figures that we are putting together. There is an 
increase in population, there is an increase in crowding, 
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and that reflects itself oh the ability of people to 
constrain themselves and conduct themselves in accordance 
with the law. But notwithstanding the reasons for it, 
and once again, there is no evidence to support the claim 
that crime is increasing because penalties are decreasing, 
for indeed they are not. There is a growing sense of 
futility and desperation among the society we life in, and 
I am sure all of you have suffered it and been aware of it, 
that we are failing to deal with the problem of crime. 
We are not addressing ourselves to it properly, we are not 
doing enough about it, we are not preventing it, and each 
and every fall or every two years, or whatever it is, when 
you hear the campaigns of the politicians stoke up in the 
fall, the common word is, "Well, you ought to elect me 
because I am going to reduce crime, I am going to deal 
more harshly with the malefactors as they are convicted 
and will put an end to this fear and panic and desperation 
and futility we are feeling because our system appears not 
to be adequately working*" 
But,^ladies and gentlemen, there has been 
a study done in Utah by very competent individuals called 
a Time Series Analysis of Crime in Utah in which it was 
simply concluded after citing literally hundreds of 
thousands of statistics contrary to the defense's argument, 
but consistent with those previous, we find no evidence 
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that th£ certainty of execution has provided an effective 
deterrent to murder in Utah, That is the fact of the 
matter, the deterrence theory is incorrect and it's 
based on incorrect assumptions and partial data. 
Well, he says it will prevent a repetition 
of this offense by Mr. Tillman. Well, he is right about 
that. If Elroy Tillman is dead he is not going to do any 
more damage to anybody. You can bet on that. But let's 
look at the prospects for that proposition. 
If one would have forecast the likelihood 
that Elroy would have got to 47 without having committed 
any homicides, if you had used Mr, Christensen's arguments, 
the figures as they existed in 1955, you would have said 
that could never happen. He will commit a violent offense 
right away. 
Well, he didn't. And even if your verdict 
is correct, that violence that her says was always 
implicit in this man's character neves came forward, until 
he was 47 years old. But he is 47 years old, ladies and 
gentlemen, he is not 30, and ar life sentence* even in Utah 
which, i^ relatively easy in; thft light sentence area* as I 
am informed, tc* believe> is probably IS oil 2Q years• 
The Elroy Tillman you see today is not the 
Elroy Tillman that will fee released from prison if he is 
released from prison and paroled again, which is highly 
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unlikely in the event of his record at the end of 15 or 
20 years. The man who is the threat about which 
Mr. Christensen has addressed to you so thoroughly is a 
67-year-old man, not one of 47, His; body won11 be in the 
condition that it is now. He will have spent 15 or 20 
years in confinement. He will be broken and old and 
incapable of causing damage to anyone. That argument, 
ladies and gentlemen, is nonsense and you should disregard 
it. 
The fact.of an escape does not represent the 
ability to get out of closed confinement and you cannot 
infer that from the information you have before you. 
This man is no potential future threat to anyone and that 
cannot be an adequate justification for depriving him of 
his very lifet 
.•Well, it is said the death penalty is good 
because it increases the likelihood that others will enter 
guilty pleas to avoid the possible penalty. Well, of cours 
in the deterrence and prevention of repetition argaaments, 
that's a bizaar situation because you are sparing the very 
people under that argument that ought to be killed if the 
tenets of the argument are correct. That's, an absurd 
justification. 
Economy has been raised as an issue. Well, 
it's much cheaper to kill somebody than it is to. house theirtf 
9 3 
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1
 in prison for the rest of his life* 
2
 I will quote Mr. Justice Marshall, a member 
3
 | of the United States Supreme Court in that respect, 
4
 i "As for the argument it's cheaper to 
5
 execute a capital offender than to imprison him for life, 
6 ;
 even assuming such an argument, if true, would support a 
7
'•! capital sanction, it is simply incorrect, A disproprotionaj:e 
8
 ' amount of money is present in prisons. Too, condemned men 
9
 are not members of the prison community and executions 
10
 are expensive. Appeals are often automatic and courts 
11
 admittedly spend more time with death cases," 
12 It's fair more expensive, ladies and gentlemen^ 
13
 to apply the ultimate sanction than it is to avoid it, 
14
 That is not a valid, honest, justification for death. The 
15
 final justification is retribution, 
16 The argument that the man should be killed 
17
 I because we are entitled to exact that from him as a result 
of his conduct. He deserves it, after all. Retribution, 
an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth, the Mosaic law. 
That really is the Basis of the death penalty which, 
after all, originated far longer than 3500 years ago when 
22
 I the Mosaic law was written, 
23 J But, ladies and gentlemen, we live in a 
society that presumes to represent itself as a Christian 
18 
19 
20 
21 
24 
25
 society and the law of the New Testament repealed the Mosai 
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law, Jesus himself turned out an individual who under the 
law of his time would have been victim of an argument just 
like Mr. Christensen's, Itfs the law,, therefore, you must 
kill him for he has sinned. 
But Christ did away with that and he did away 
with it for good reason. It's not the sentence of an 
enlightened justifying society, it's not the best thing to 
do and it's at odds with the better thinking of the 
civilized world. 
None of these justifications for the death 
penalty as a general matter is, in my opinion, an adequate 
justification for continuance of this bizaar and cruel 
conduct. 
But you may well differ with me on that and 
you are entitled to. And, therefore, I suggest to you that 
notwithstanding the propriety of the death penalty on the 
whole> it is certainly inappropriate in this case. The 
central and main difficulty with the death penalty, ladies 
and gentlemen, is that it differs totally from any other • 
i 
i 
penalty. Because it is completely and utterly irrevocable.-
When the shot is fired, the chest of the victim of that. j 
• - . " • i 
shot col lapses and h i s l a s t breath escapes from his body, i 
i t and he are over . I t cannot be undone. No man has the ] 
power to brea the l i f e back in to that man from whom i t has 
been taken by s t a t e sanct ions . There i s the d i f f i c u l t y . \ 
9 5 
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We cannot then remedy our error. We have 
taken what we cannot replace• And the fact that it has 
been done to Mr. Schoenfeld is not a basis for concluding | 
that it ought to be don£ to somebody else, i 
I suggest to you that we have a situation | 
where the system of law which purports to be so good, j 
so wise, so thorough, so just, so correct, so amenable, 
so correct, so utterly founded in the will and sense of 
the people and the goodness of God, that that would presume,1 
to impose the death penalty is so utterly and completely 
imperfect • And you have seen evidence of the imperfection 
of the system in this very case. You have seen the 
proposition that a murder was found to have been committed, 
that the policemen went down, looked into it for a day or 
two, found an easy way to solve it and didn't look any 
further• -
Elroy's house was never searched, according 
to the evidence of this case, to see if there was something 
to support the claim Car la Sagers made to you, and that you 
believed. 
But there is still no evidence that physically 
places Elroy at the scene or corroborates; what she said to 
you, and had they only looked* and if her story is true, 
ladies and gentlemen, that evidence should have been found. 
There was no search of her apartment. We don't know what 
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has been secreted there, we don't know what happened to 
her shirt that she lied about to the policemen. Couldn't 
turn up. Omitted to talk about it. Why did she hide it? 
Why did she lie about it? I don't know, I attempted in th^ 
guilt phase to argue inferences that arose from those 
differences to you. But once again we may disagree about 
the strength of those inferences and I cannot criticize youj: 
verdict, but those questions still remain, 
Mr, Justice Marshall in the case in which the 
Supreme Court finally"overturned the death penalty in 1972, 
summed it up this wayf ladies and gentlemen: "No matter 
how careful courts are, the possibility of perjured 
testimony, mistaken honest testimony and human error will 
remain all too real. We have no way of judging how many 
innocent persons have been executed but we can be certain 
that there were some. Whether there were many is an open 
question made difficult by the loss of those who were most 
knowledgeable about the crime for which they were convicted 
Surely there will be more as long as capital punishment 
remains a part of our penal law," 
Now, there is an error in this case, ladies 
and gentlemen. It's an error of ignorance. We don't know 
what all the evidence is. You see, to be sufficiently 
arrogant, to say to you you ought to foreclose any 
possibility of fixing an error if one has been made, we 
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ought to be able to say to ourselves, "Members of this 
jury, we have seen every possible potential piece of 
evidence there is. We have heard the testimony of all of 
the friends and associate's of Mark Schoenfeld, including 
those who may have had a motive to do to him what was donef 
We have talked to all the people that may have disliked him 
or may have had difficulty with him. We have talked to 
everybody that Mr. Tillman knows to find out what they say 
about him and help us assess things a bit better. 
"We have talked to the very conscience of 
Carla Sagers and Lori Groneman, We have been able to look 
into their minds, not clouded by the language of their 
mouths or the questions of the prosecutor. We have been 
able to peer in there and see the pure and honest truth of 
what they said, not shaped and tortured and dragged out 
of them and suppressed by the defense lawyers and the 
prosecutors," 
Were the system that good, ladies and 
gentlemen, I wouldn't question the arguments that 
Mr. Christensen has made. But I tell you as an experienced 
member of the bar of this court, that our system of criminajL 
justice is not that good, • 
It does make errors. You read about them in 
the papers, every day. You will recall the most common 
criticism is, "Well, far tod many crooks get away. They're 
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not called to task, They can manipulate the system. They 
can evade it, they can get breaks, like Mr. Christensen 
makes up about this chart here. Breaks, Well, there is 
truth to that* There i£ also truth that who is better 
capable of manipulating the system than those most familiar 
with it, the police? They know better how to shape the 
raw material out of which individuals are.forged than 
anyone does. 
That raw material, ladies and gentlemen, 
is the evidence. And in this case you don't have all the 
evidence and I don't have it all* Nobody bothered to look 
for it or find it or bring it to your attention. 
And so I respectfully submit# ladies and 
gentlemen, that although your verdict may well be 
jusitified by the evidence in this case, there must remain 
in some of your hearts a scintilla, a small but gnawing 
doubt that that verdict is in all cases correct, and so long 
as that doubt persists, then imposition of the death 
penalty is wrong, for you cannot undo it. 
And you cannot sit comfortably and assume that 
five or ten or seven years from now some new piece of 
evidence isn't going to come forward that is going to make 
what we have done here a shambles, a mockery of the 
truth borne of our ignorance and our imperfections. 
' This is a very serious problem and it happens 
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all the time and it may happen again and, therefore, we musj 
be extremely cautious when the ultimate penalty is made. 
In this case, ladies and gentlemen, you have 
heard at least three witnesses who have materially perjured) 
their testimony. I think thatfs clear to you/ I am not 
certain that those lies, if you will, were to the critical 
issues, I am certain in some cases they weren't, but you 
know Lori Groneman lied about the extent of this harrassmen{i; 
2Q or 30 times it happened. Her father lied about the 
timing of that sign. He wasn't just incorrect, his son 
parroted the same lie. 
The State admitted it was incorrect testimony) 
and Caria Sagers forgot to tell you some important things 
that she appears to have mentioned to pet, Thirsk about her| 
complicity in the event. They lied a little bit. How do we 
know the extent of it? How can you impose death when some 
of the people on whom this verdict rests have materially 
falsified themselves and the knowledge of the extent of 
it may not be as sufficient as it should be because of my 
imperfections or those of the police, 
It's not right to foreclose the possibility 
of error. In summation, the penalty of death is far too 
awesome to be imposed by a system as imperfect as ours, 
particularly in a case where there are some inherent 
defects and problems with it. 
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Once again, Mr, Justice Stewart of the Supreme 
Court said the penalty of death differs from all other 
forms of criminal punishment, not in degree but in kind. 
It's unique in its total irrevocability. It's unique in 
its rejection of rehabilitation of the convict as a basic 
purpose of criminal justice and it's unique, finally, in 
its absolute renunciation of all that is embodied in our 
concept of humanity. 
And another, Mr, Justice Stewart of our own 
Supreme Court said, "Death in its finality differs from 
life imprisonment more than a hundred prison terns differs 
from one of only a year or two. Because of that quantitati 
difference, there is a corresponding difference in the 
need for reliability in the determination that death is 
appropriate punishment in any specific case," 
And thus it is the instructions that you havej 
were born and they require that you exclude any and all 
possible doubt, both about guilt and innocence and about 
the propriety of that penalty. 
Now, as I alluded to before, ladies and 
gentlemen, the debate over the morality and practicality of 
the death penalty has been raised from time in memorial, 
but it has been focused in the last few years and, as I 
indicated in 1972 the Supreme Court of the United States 
did away with it and they did away with it in a way that 
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I didn't particularly admire very much, but I would like 
to talk to you about it just briefly, 
it was alleged in the cases that led to the 
decision, and the name of the case was Furmanv« Georgia 
that the death penalty was being inappropriately applied 
to blacks• 
That of the total number of individuals 
executed, a far disproportionate number were black and 
that it was a penalty almost reserved in some states for 
the black members of society who traditionally did not have 
the means or the education or the skill to make proper 
defenses for themselves. 
And so the Supreme Court took those cruel 
and unusual arguments and they made a holding in them. 
And that holding is summed up again by Mr, Justice Stewart 
saying, "These death sentences are cruel and unusual in the 
same way being struck by lightening is cruel and unusual. 
For of all the people convicted of rapes and murders in 
19 67 and 1968, many just as reprehensible as these, the 
petitioners are among a capriciously selected random handfu 
upon whom the sentences of death has in fact been imposed." 
My concurring brothers have demonstrated 
that if any basis can be discerned for the selection of 
these fewr to be sentenced to die, it is the constitutionally 
impennissible basis of race. But racial discrimination 
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has not been-proved and indeed i t wasn' t in t h a t case and 
I put i t t o one s i d e ; I simply conclude that the Eighth 
and Fourteenth Amendments cannot t o l e ra t e the i n f l i c t i o n 
of a sentence of death under a. legal , system t h a t permits 
th i s unique penalty to be so wantonly and frequently 
imposed. 
Now, in another port ion of the opinion 
Mr'. Jus t i ce Marshall s e t forth some s t a t i s t i c s and what 
they generally went to was the proposit ion t h a t over the 
past few years half of the people executed for murder were 
black, when the propos i t ion was 11 per cent , and t h a t in 
the area of rape in which over the period 19 30 to 19 72 
455 people were executed, a l l bu t 48 of them were black, 
40S were black and 48 were whi te . j 
• i 
What he sa id was tha t in 197 2 when Furman j 
ij 
came down and the death penalty was done away with and j 
i 
there were 356 people ori death row, and in the preceding j 
i 
years there had only been four or five executions. Now, j 
what the Supreme Court says with this penalty is improper i 
because it's, imposed with one wanton and reckless j 
freakishness. It's so rare as to be almost akin to being j 
struck by lightening. It's not sensibly administered 
across the board. We don't have a rational basis of
 r 
picking -up the most horrible murders and executing those. * 
Itfs just a random situation like going on television and j 
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1 be cranked up in a bin of these contest applications and. th€Jy p 
2 one out every three or four years and shoot the guy whose 
3 name is on the thing. Now,, that is what has happened over 
I ' • * 
4 the years, j 
• ! 
5 So now what happens is in 1973, in response j 
6 to our legislature, they go to tremendous effort to put j 
7 together the scheme of inflicting the death penalty that \ 
8 has been at issue in this case and that you are asked to \ 
9 decide on. And then about 39 or 40 other states do the I 
10 same thing. Tremendous clamor for thq death penalty and \ 
11 it resulted in it being restored in probably four out of [ 
12 five of the states, but look what's happened since, 
13 Time. Magazine this month says there are aboutf 
14 1129 men on death row in the United States, Twice as many 
15 as there were when Furman was decided, and do you know how 
16 many executions there have been since 19 7 2? 
17 Six. 
18 What has changed since the Supreme Court was 
19 led to conclude that the death penalty was imposed with 
20 wanton and freakish irregularity? 
21 I respectfully suggest to you, ladles and 
22 gentlemen, that nothing has changed. That i t ' s s t i l l the 
23 j o k e of f a t e t h a t o n e i n d i v i d u a l i s e x e c u t e d and o t h e r s 
24 are spared and, in fact, you have seen i t in this state, 
25 You are entitled and responsible to look at 
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your own backgrounds and conditions and the knowledge of 
your community in determining the appropriateness of the 
penalty in this case, And I want yott to think back on 
your knowledge and affairs of the courts and think the last 
time this, a Salt Lake County jury, came back and sentenced 
a man to death. See if among yourselves you can think of 
one. There has beeii.one execution in Utah, which 
incidentally did not result in any decrease in the crime 
rate or homicide rate, but in Salt Lake County, to my j 
recollection, there hasn't been a death penalty imposed 
since Lance and Killpack were sentenced to die clear back 
in the 19 60's. The" Hi-Fi casS is an exception. And it was 
a crime so heinous that if there is ever an occasion when 
the death penalty should be imposed, that's it. 
But, ladies and gentlemen, this case is a far 
cousin of that one. The individuals are not the same, the 
crime was not the same, and if it was proper in that case, 
there is no reason to conclude it's proper in this case. 
But I believe by the lack of verdicts of death in our 
county here, and of jurors in your situation, that we have 
a reflection of a community standard wherein eight or nine 
or ten jurors just like you have sat in your place and 
examined the facts of various homicides committed in 
Salt Lake County, And I believe that their failure to have 
returned death verdicts, unless you can think of some that I 
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can't recall> indicates that those juries, just like you, 
will reflect a community standard that is saying in effect, 
"The community standard in this Christian community is 
that we want to have the deatft penalty on the book but we 
believe that_itfs such an awesome penalty that it should be 
saved for only the most atrocious, hideous kind of offenses 
like the Hi-Fi case where the victims were mercilessly 
tortured physically, mentally and physically, or their 
bodies were abused.fI This is not that kind of a case and 
if that is what the juries in this district have said, I 
commend them for it, because I think it shows common sense 
and^humanity. 
And if you were to come to that same 
conclusion, and understand as our Supreme Court has said, 
that even among murderers there are degrees of culpability, 
there are degrees to which the ultimate penalty is deserved 
and we should respect that, notwithstanding our abhorrence 
of the crime of murder, 
In summation, ladies and gentlemen, when you 
apply the lesser sanction of life imprisonment in this 
case, and reject the clamor for revenge by death, you 
will in no way be condoning the act for which my client 
stands legally responsible. 
You will not be belittling the magnitude of 
the offense of murder and you will not be condoning the 
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1 death of Mark Schoenfeld or forgiving the acts that you 
2 have attributed to Elroy Tillman, 
3 What such a verdict of life imprisonment 
4
 in this case is that a finding; that justice must be tempered 
5 by mercy. Even among convicted murderers there are those 
6 less deserving of death than others and the ultimate 
7 penalty should be served for those who commit the most 
8 hideous and reprehensible acts among the crimes of murder, 
9 Now, Mr. Tillman's family has gotten on the 
10 stand and I have talked about this record. This is a family 
11 that does love Elroy, He has been nothing to write home 
12 about during his life. He spent an awful lot of years in 
13 prison, but when he has been there he has mandated respect, 
14 His family loves him and it's not because he's a man that 
15 only a mother could love, 
16 Doris Tillman is an intelligent woman. She 
17 is no dumb somebody that just follows him around like 
18 Michael tried to infer to you. She's an intelligent 
19 woman. She's a trained nurse and she tells you that she 
20 loves him notwithstanding his faults, 
21 I A man that is loved by a woman of that calibe 
22 I cannot be so reprehensible as to deserve death. She says 
23 | his son loves him and he loves his son. Who are we to 
24 | rob that child even of the decent memory of his father when 
25 | a man of experience thati Elroy has might well be a 
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substantial good influence on him by teaching him from long[-
sad experience what is right and what is wrong. 
His family remembers the good things about 
him and they express concern in the spring of this year-, 
and I tell you, ladies and gentlemen, we have not yet 
unraveled the end of that. His concern for his own safety a[nd 
well-being was so great he imposed on his brother who in a 
single call was willing to come up here and support him in 
his hour of needf That is not the inner family loyalty and 
respect that you would find on a man who is worthy of 
simply being trashed and put in the trash heap and done 
away with forever. 
He should be shared because he has been able 
to command that kind of respect and love from other -human 
beings. He has helped his neighbors in that vicinity. 
He is not a man who should be killed and removed from the 
face of the Earth, 
Mike talks kind of out of the two sides of 
his mouth in a sense, I don't say that critically. But 
he says this was a cold, calculated, planned for months, 
according to Carla here, but on the other hand he says the 
basis for the crime, motive for it, was jealousy. Jealousy 
is an emotion. It's emotion that caused the offense to 
occur, if the State's theory is correct. Emotion 
generated by Lori Groneman, Beautiful woman, apparently, 
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passel of trouble for Elroy, but a woman who apparently 
had the a b i l i t y to manipulate him some, too , I don ' t know 
why t h i s thing occurred, But i f the S t a t e ' s theory i s 
co r rec t , there apparent ly was extremely emotional d i s t r e s s 
tha t led a man to do something u t t e r l y i r r a t i o n a l for some 
reason known only t o himself and probably inexpl icable to 
any of u s , 
But t h a t i s something that has been found 
by our l e g i s l a t u r e to be a mit igat ing circumstance, Ladies 
and gentlemen, I burdened yon far too long. In t h i s s t a t e 
the l e g i s l a t u r e has been kind to you because by requi r ing 
tha t you unanimously find t h a t death is the only 
acceptable and j u s t penal ty , he places —• the l e g i s l a t u r e 
has placed d i r ec t r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for the l i f e and existence 
of Elroy Tillman on each one of you individual ly . 
You each have the r igh t to withhold your vote 
for the unanimous pena l ty of death and thus you each, I 
expect, have your f inger on the t r igger , and I do not envy 
you of t h a t r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . But I think you cannot shirk 
i t any more than I can shi rk my obl iga t ions . 
And i n t h a t r e spec t , you should have ca l led 
to your a t t e n t i o n the proposi t ion, tha t the man tha t s i t s 
a t counsel tab le he re , 47 years old - - stand up, Elroy — 
tr im, l i g h t , somewhat young - - Mike has made much, about 
h is a b i l i t y to be younger in h i s youth than I could. 
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Si t down, That ' s not the man t h a t ' s going to be taken out 
of the c e l l some morning f ive or six years hence and 
shuffled across the pr ison yard at the Utah State"Prison 
and sat down in an oak chair in front of some sandbags and 
shot to death. The man tha t that i s going to have tha t 
happen to him d o e s n ' t even e x i s t ye t . 
Before the death penalty i s imposed in th i s 
state* we have interminable delay; Tillman wouldn't be 47 
i f you find the death penal ty here when he ' s executed. 
He wil l be 53 or 4 or 5 or 6 or 7, And what he i s then 
may not bei in any r e spec t whatever ref lected by what Mike 
says he i s now or you may bel ieve he is now. 
The man who w i l l face the f i r ing squad a t the 
Utah State Prison d o e s n ' t now ex i s t . We don ' t know what 
w i l l happen in t h a t in ter im. We don' t know whether w e ' l l 
discover he i s innocent , we don ' t know whether he w i l l 
wr i te a great book of a symphony, I don ' t know whether he 
w i l l become the Birditian of Alcatraz for whom we a l l 
rooted for in the movies, but we do know tha t when t h i s 
man shuffles across the yard to the wall a t the pr ison, 
he i s going to be a l o t d i f fe rent than he i s now. 
So we don ' t r e a l l y in any r ea l sense know 
what we're doing when we impose that penalty, And for 
t h a t reason, i f for tha t reason alone, i t ' s unfair and 
i t ' s wrong because we can ' t appreciate the qua l i ty now of 
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what we're doing then. Perhaps, ladies and gentlemen, 
the only and the main and fundamental difficulty with the 
death penalty at all is thait the rectitude and propriety 
of the verdicts that justify it under our system depend on 
men like me to see they are correct, 
I don't have the arrogance to come to you 
and tell you that I have done the kind of a. job that I can 
with confidence, say that the best job was done as it shoulji 
have been done, all the evidence was educed, the arguments 
were presented correctly and forcefully, and that you 
could not have been convinced otherwise had I not been 
better. 
As long as the system depends on me for the 
quality of its verdict and the rectitude of its penalties, 
ladies and gentlemen, the death penalty should not be 
imposed. And I, therefore, respectfully suggest and beg, 
really, that you consider these factors as you retire to 
deliberate, that you temper justice with mercy, that you 
remember the best thing about our civilization is respect 
for humanity and our love for our fellow men and you come 
back with a verdict of life imprisonment which, ladies and 
gentlemen, after all, in many ways is not a break but which) 
is itself a tremendous penalty that still leaves us the 
opportunity of forgiveness and for restitution if we have 
made errors. 
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We submit it to you and thank you for your 
tremendous service to this community in this case in both 
phases of the trial. 
THE COURT: Mr. Christensen? 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: Thank you, your Honor, 
It's always interesting to me how defense counsel get a 
little religion in these cases even though you may have 
seen an absence of it throughout the trial. 
I am sure we're all, to some degree or other, 
scholars of the Bible, the Mosaic law, the law of 
Christianity and all the rest of the factors Mr. Barber 
brought out in his closing remarks to you. And if I might 
for a moment indulge in that, in discussing a little of the 
Mosaic law yourself, you recall as the chosen, as they were 
called, were traveling through the wilderness, they were 
much like Elroy Tillman. They didnft heed the many 
miraculous instances of being saved, they were rotten and 
it took them 40 years to purge their souls. Forty years, 
not fifteen years as a life imprisonment would mean. 
Forty years of humility and remorse and resentence and all 
the other things that characterize human beings. 
And as they entered the Promised Land, the 
old adage of the God of the Old Testament to whom we know 
to be Jesus, made the comment, "God will not be itiocked." 
And Moses, as he sat there overlooking the chosen as they 
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entered the Promised Land knew himself because he had shed 
innocent blood, he could not tasteof the land of milk and 
honey, and enter into the Promised Land because God would 
not be mocked, And if you read, as Mr. Barber indicated, 
the article on the death penalty that appeared in Time 
Magazine this month, probably one of the greatest advocates 
you would think against the death penalty would be Jesus 
himself as he was hanging on the cross for crimes he didnft 
commit* 
But he didn't say capital punishment is bad, 
he says forgive if you can but again, God will not be 
mocked. And turning the cheek seven times, as the State ha^ 
done, and you may say seven times seventy, if that were 
feasible, because we know that on the seventh turn of the 
cheek in Mr. Tillman's case he murdered somebody and 
society itself says we cannot tolerate that because to 
allow that would provide for the extinction of mankind. 
And, again, God cannot be mocked and 40 years 
of purging will not. bring back Mark Schoenfeld's life, I 
am always, I suppose, repulsed by the contention that 
Mr. Barber raises of the fact that the system has failed. 
Well, you are part of the system, ladies and gentlemen. 
Those prior felony convictions are from jurors like 
yourselves who have had to sit tedius hour upon hour 
and listen to and sift through facts to arrive at those 
113 
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convictions. And there is not a system on the face of the 
Earth, including the Mosaic law or the law of Christianity, 
that will work unless the individual soul wishes it to work 
If that individual soul rebells against the 
most sacred of obligations, to protect human life, or 
chastity or the Ten Commandments, or all the other things 
that Elroy Tillman has broken along the way, no system in 
the world will work without the person himself humility-wis^ 
and with remorse saying, KI want it to work," and you 
haven't heard Elroy Tillman say that. 
In fact, if you have looked at Elroy Tillman 
you probably haven't seen one ounce of remorse other than 
to cast blame on the State's witnesses or the system or 
his being black or whatever else you want to characterize 
the blame as. 
And as Mr, Barber read you from appellate 
decisions on appeals, as are provided from these types of 
cases, there is not one sentence in any of those judges 
saying that capital punishment is unlawful and we will not 
impose it* Otherwise, you wouldn't be sitting here today. 
On the contrary, when the Supreme Court in 
Furman vf Georgia outlawed the death penalty, because at 
that time it was arbitrary and capricious and there were 
states in the union who said any killing or any rape or 
any kidnapping, regardless of the consequence of the 
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kidnapping can result in death, they were admittedly 
acknowledging it was an arbitrary and capricious execution 
and a punishment. But-you now are going to read portions 
of the Furman v, Georgia decision and Jarirett v, Texas and 
Lockett and all the rest of the cases that have come down 
regarding the capital punishment. And one of those almost 
quoted verbatim from Furman v, Georgia are the standards 
and the criteria you must consider, the age, prior crimes, 
and all the rest. So you see, the law has been refined 
from those decisions that Mr. Barber read from and the 
Supreme Court to this day says that the death penalty is 
an appropriate sanction in those circumstances as in this 
case where the aggravating by proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt outweigh the mitigating circumstances of a case. 
And interestingly enough, when Furman was 
handed down almost every state in the union scampered to 
revitalize and recomply with the new mandates of the court. 
California, for instance, 71 per cent of the 
referendum of the people in that state said, f,We want and 
we need a death penalty," You're not in the minority 
sitting here, ladies and gentlemen. The bulge of this 
country recognizes whether you call it Mosaic law or the 
law of Christianity oil whatever you want to call it, in 
your moral scheme of things, that there are situations 
where the sentence of death is appropriate and must be 
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carried out. You're only a part of that sifting process. 
The appeal at courts are the other part of that sifting 
process to determine whether or not there was perjury, as 
Mr* Barber would want yoii to believe. Apparently you don't 
believe that-or you wouldn't Be here right now.* 
Can you honestly say to yourselves 15 years 
hence that a person showing the lack of remorse Mr. Tillman 
has shown is going to be a better person when he gets out 
or that he is not going to, as he said in the one statement 
to Lori Groneman, "Don't you know I will kill you, Bitch?" 
That wasn't made in the present, that was 
made in the future. And again it gets back to risk 
assessment and what you yourselves can live with, sleep 
comfortably with at night. And we always want to drag in 
the going to this shooting or firing squad, and Mr, Tillman 
will lumber down the way to the firing scpiad and all the 
rest, but during that period of time,. Mr, Tillman will have 
a chance to make amends with his god, if he has one. 
But think of Mark Schoenfeld, Snuffed at 
29 years of ag& for no reason whatsoever. He didn't even 
have the right of due process, as Mr. Tillmaii has had. Not 
even the courtesy of waking1 him up to allow him to self-
defend himself, as Mr. Tillman has had with able and 
competent counsel. 
So if you're feeling sorry for Mr, Tillman, 
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swing the scales of justice back into balance and consider 
both sides. That's all the State wants you to do. That's 
all the law mandates that you do. You now have the chance 
to deliberate and make that deliberatioh the most important 
decision in your present life and one you can live with in 
the future. 
Thank you again for your attention in this 
matter and we hope this matter will mean as much to you as 
it does to the people of this community. It's now your 
turn to deliberate* 
THE COURT: You may swear the bailiff, 
Mr, Shewell, 
[Whereupon, the clerk swore the bailiff to 
take charge of the jury,] 
THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, 
before you enter the jury room, you may take a brief recess 
go to the restroom,, get a glass of water, 
I admonish you to speak to no one, let no 
one speak to you and don't start your deliberations or talk 
about the case until you are all in the jury room and have 
had a brief recess. And the instructions and the verdict 
will go with you and this No, 8 was the only exhibit that 
was to go, was it not? 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: It was, your Honor, 
THE COURT: All right. The jury may follow 
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the bailiff,. 
[Whereupon, the jury retired to deliberate 
at the hour of 3;08 p.m.] 
THE COURT: Counsel may take their exceptions 
to the Court's instructions as given and to those requested 
but not given. 
MR. BARBER: Your Honor, the only exceptions 
we would have to the instructions was, of course, failure 
to give all the suggested defense instructions that were 
tendered to the Court. 
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Christensen? 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: I might ask the record to 
reflect that the State's proof beyond a reasonable doubt 
standard was removed and the defendant's instructions 
regarding the aggravating totality and proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt was the instruction given by the Court. 
MR, BARBER: And that's correct. 
MR, CHRISTENSEN: I have no further exception^ 
MR, BARBER: There is one other matter and 
we would like leave to search the law on the issue, but 
during the argument, Mr. Christensen did refer to the 
defendant's failure to testify which we believe justifies 
a mistrial and a discharge^ of the jury in this case and 
the mandatory imposition of the life penalty, 
THE COURT: The motion will be denied at 
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this time. We'll be in — 
MR. BARBER: May we have leave to renew it in 
a brief? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. BARBER: Thank you, your Honor, 
THE COURT: We'll be in informal session, 
gentlemen, until the jury returns, 
[Whereupon, court was in informal session ! 
pending the return of the jury.] I 
[Whereupon the jury returned to the courtroomj 
at the hour of 10:05 p.m.] 
THE COURT: The record may show that all 12 
of the jurors have returned to the courtroom. The defendant 
is present with counsel* The State is present. 
.1 Mr. Parcell, you are the foreman. Have you 
reached a verdict? 
MR, PARCELL: Yes, your Honor, we have, 
THE COURT: Would you hand them to the bailiff, 
please? 
You may read the verdict, 
[Whereupon the clerk read the verdict.) 
THE COURT: I shall poll the jury, I shall 
ask but one question of the jurors, 
Miss Finkle, this is your verdict? 
MISS FINKLE: Yes, it is. 
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verdict? 
THE COURT: 
MR. SASAKE: 
THE COURT: 
MISS YATES: 
THE COURT: 
Mr, Sasake, is this your verdict? 
Yes. 
Miss Yates, is this your verdict? 
i 1. 
Yes. 
Mr, Feltonberg, is this your . 
MR. FELTONBERG: Yes. 
THE COURT: 
MISS BAKER: 
THE COURTr 
MISS CURTIS 
THE COURT: 
MR. MYERS: 
THE COURT: 
MISS LAMB: 
THE COURT: 
MR. TALBOT: 
Miss Baker, is this your verdict? 
Yes. ' 
Miss Curtis, is this your verdict? 
: Yes. 
Mr, Myers, is this your verdict? 
Yes. 
Miss Lamb, is this your verdict? 
Yes. 
Mr, Talbot, is this your verdict? 
Yes. 
verdict? 
verdict? 
THE COURT: Mr. Rusher, is this your verdict? 
MR* RUSHER: Yes. 
THE COURT: And Miss Ellscamp, is this your 
MISS ELLSCAMP: Yes. 
THE COURT: And Mr, Par cell, is this your 
MR, PARCELL: Yes. 
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1 THE COURT: The jury has been polled and they 
2 have unanimously re turned and advised tha t t h i s i s t he i r 
3 ve rd i c t , 
4 Is there any reason why the verdict should 
5 not be received? 
6 MR. CHRISTENSEN: State has no reason, your 
7 Honor, 
8 THE COURT: Mr. Barber? 
9 MR. BARBER: I am not familiar with the form 
10 of t ha t ques t ion, your Honor, and would reserve any 
11 ob jec t ions . 
12 THE COURT: Well, any objection you have will 
13 | be reserved, but at this time is there any reason that it 
14 should not be received from a technical standpoint? 
15 MR. BARBER: Not that I can think of, but I 
16 would reserve. 
17 . THE COURT: All right. The verdict will be 
18 received. Itfs the duty of the Court in this matter to 
19 impose the sentence required in not less than two nor more 
20 than thirty days unless for good cause or good reason-
21 otherwise shown it shall be extended, I shall at this 
22 time —• do you have any reason why it should not be set in 
23 less than two nor more than thirty? 
24 MR> BARBER: There is no such reason, your 
25 Honor* 
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THE COURT: All right, I will set sentence 
in the mattert What is the date today? I can't read that 
far, 
THE CLERK: January 20. 
THE COURT: January 20, I shall set 
sentence on th£ 28th day of January 19 83 at the hour of 
9:00 a,m. and in the meantime the jury having returned a 
verdict, the jury will be released and the verdict will be 
received. 
Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, I wish to 
thank you for your services and you will be released and 
discharged. Other matters are now those of the court and 
I would suggest and request those of you who may have any 
parking tickets, any other matters that you may give them—| 
mail them in to the bailiff or to me. I would suggest and 
request that the jury not consent to be interviewed by the 
press or anyone else. That's your privilege and your right 
I would suggest and recommend that you not agree to be 
interviewed and consent to interview by the press> by the 
media and it is your right not to be interviewed or talked 
to. However, you may do as you desire. 
If there is nothing further, court will reces£ 
until 9:00 a.m. tomorrow morning. 
[Whereupon, court was in recess,] 
* * * 
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